# FREE LIMITS OF FORCING AND MORE ON ARONSZAJN TREES ${ }^{\dagger}$ 

BY<br>S. SHELAH ${ }^{*}$


#### Abstract

We prove that the Souslin Hypothesis does not imply "every Aron. (= Aronszajn) tree is special". For this end we introduce variants of the notion "special Aron. tree". We also introduce a limit of forcings bigger than the inverse limit, and prove it preserves properness and related notions not less than inverse limit, and the proof is easier in some respects.


## 81. Free limits

1.1. Discussion and Definitions. For $\boldsymbol{A}$ a set of propositional variables, $\lambda$ a regular cardinal, then: $L_{\lambda}(A)$ is the set of propositional sentences generated by $A$, by negation and conjunction and disjunctions on sets of power $<\lambda$. So $L_{\mu}(A)=\bigcup_{\lambda<\mu} L_{\lambda}(A)$ for $\mu$ limit cardinal $\left(>\boldsymbol{N}_{0}\right)$ or $\infty$. Let $\varphi, \psi, \theta$ denote sentences; $\Phi, \Psi$ set of sentences.

We define (in $\left.L_{\infty}(\lambda)\right) \vdash \psi$, or $\Phi \vdash \psi$ as usual (the rules of the finite case) and $\Phi \vdash \wedge \Phi$, from $\Phi \vdash \varphi_{i}$ for $i \in I$ deduce $\Phi \vdash \Lambda_{i \in I} \varphi_{i}$, and let $\vee_{i} \varphi_{i}=\neg \wedge_{i} \neg \varphi_{i}$.

Always $\vdash$ means in $L_{\infty}(A)$ even if we deal with $L_{\lambda}(A)$.
The following is well known.
1.2. Theorem. The following are equivalent for $\Phi, \varphi$ :
(1) $\Phi \vdash \varphi$;
(2) there is no model of $\Phi \cup\{\neg \varphi\}$ with truth values in a complete Boolean algebra;

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(3) if $\lambda$ is such that $|\Phi|$, and the power of any set on which we make conjunction in some $\theta \in \Phi \cup\{\varphi\}$ is $\geqq \lambda, P$ the collapsing of $\lambda$ to $\omega$ by finite functions then

$$
\mathbb{H}_{P} \text { "there is no model of } \Phi \cup\{\neg \varphi\} \text { ". }
$$

Remark. This can be proven by a small fragment of ZFC, I think admissibility axioms, at least when we prove only (1) $\Leftrightarrow$ (3). Hence (by proving not (1) implies not (3)).
1.3. Conclusion. If $A$ is a transitive admissible set, $\Phi, \varphi \in A$ then " $\Phi \vdash \varphi$ " has the same truth value in $V$ and in $A$.
1.4. Definition. For given $A$ and $\theta \in L_{x}(A)$, let $\mathrm{FF}_{\lambda}(\theta)$ be $\left\{\psi: \psi \in L_{\lambda}(A)\right.$, $\theta \nvdash \neg \psi\}$ partially ordered by $\psi_{1} \leqq \psi_{2}$ if $\theta \wedge \psi_{2} \vdash \psi_{1}$.
(FF denotes free-forcing; we can identify $\varphi, \psi$ if $\varphi \leqq \psi \leqq \varphi$.)
Reversing the definition of $\leqq$ and adding a minimal element, we get a Boolean algebra in which every set of $<\lambda$ elements has a least upper bound provided we identify $\psi_{1}, \psi_{2}$ when $\theta \vdash \psi_{1} \equiv \psi_{2}$.

Convention. $P, Q$ denote forcing notions, i.e., partially ordered sets with a minimal element 0 , such that if $p \nsubseteq q$ then there is $r, p \leqq r$ and $r$ incompatible with $q$.
1.5. Definition. $P ৫ Q$ for partial orders $P, Q$ if ( $P \subseteq Q$ and)
(a) for $p, q \in P, p, q$ are compatible in $P$ iff they are compatible in $Q$; and $p \leqq q$ in $R$ implies $p \leqq q$ in $Q$,
(b) every predense subset of $P$ is a predense subset of $Q$.

Remark (1). In BA terminology we would say "a complete Boolean subalgebra". Everything is dual.
(2) In fact (a) is not absolutely necessary.
1.6. Definition. For any $P$ let $\theta[P]$ be the following sentence: $\wedge\{c \rightarrow \neg d \wedge b \rightarrow a: a, b \in P, a \leqq b, c, d \in P, c, d$ incompatible $\} \wedge \wedge\left\{\vee_{a \in I} a\right.$ : $I \subseteq P$ a maximal set of pairwise incompatible elements $\}.$
1.6a. Definition. Let $P_{i}(i<\delta)$ be $\varangle$-increasing, $\delta$ an ordinal ( $\lambda$ an infinite regular cardinal). Then their $\lambda$-free limit $\left(\mathrm{F} \lim _{i<\delta}^{\lambda} P_{i}\right)$ is $\mathrm{FF}_{\lambda}\left(\Lambda_{i<\delta} \theta\left[P_{i}\right]\right)$ (where the set of propositional variables is $U_{i<\delta} P_{i}$ ).
1.7. Claim. $P \lessdot Q$ implies $\theta[Q] \vdash \theta[P]$, and $P \ll \mathrm{FF}_{\lambda}(\theta[P])$.

Proof. Trivial.

Remark. Our. notation may be confusing, as for conditions $p, q \in P, p \wedge q$ is " $p$ and $q$ ", i.e., both are in the generic set; i.e., the same notation as in a BA.
1.8. Claim. If as in Definition 1.6a, $P_{\delta}$ is the $\lambda$-free limit of $P_{i}(i<\delta)$ then $P_{i} ৫ P_{\delta}$ for $i<\delta$.

Proof. Let us check the conditions.
(b) Let $I \subseteq P_{i}$ be a maximal set of pairwise incompatible elements of $P_{i}$. Suppose $\varphi \in \mathrm{F} \lim _{i<\delta}^{\lambda} P_{i}$ is incompatible with each $a \in I$. As $\varphi \in \mathrm{F} \lim _{i<\delta}^{\lambda} P_{i}$ by definition $\Lambda_{i<\delta} \theta\left[P_{i}\right] \nvdash \neg \varphi$. So by 1.2, after some forcing there is a model of $\varphi$, $\Lambda_{j<\delta} \theta\left[P_{i}\right]$. But $V_{a \in I} a$ is a conjunct of the second sentence, so in the model some $a \in I$ is true. So after some forcing, there is a model of $\varphi \wedge a, \wedge_{j<\delta} \theta\left[P_{j}\right]$, so by $1.2 \wedge_{j<\delta} \theta\left[P_{i}\right] \nvdash \neg(\varphi \wedge a)$, so $\varphi \wedge a \in \mathrm{FF}_{\lambda}\left(\wedge_{i<\delta} \theta\left[P_{i}\right]\right)$; so $\varphi, a$ are compatible.
(a) Let $a, b \in P_{i}$, if they are compatible in $P_{i}$, for some $c \in P_{i}, a \leqq c, b \leqq c$, and this clearly holds in $P_{\delta}$ by its definition.

If they are incompatible then $a \rightarrow \neg b$ appears as a conjunct in $\theta\left[P_{i}\right]$ and we can finish. Similarly for $a, b \in P_{i}, a \leqq b$ in $P_{i}$ implies $a \leqq b$ in $P_{\delta}$.

## §2. Preservation by free limit

Definition. (1) If $N<(H(\lambda), \in),|P|<\lambda, P \in N$ a forcing notion, $q \in P$, then $q$ is $(P, N)$-generic if for every predense $I \subseteq P$, which belongs to $N, I \cap N$ is predense above $p$.
(2) $P$ is called proper if for every $\lambda$ big enough (any $\lambda>2^{|P|}$ suffices, see [8]) $N<(H(\lambda), \in)$ is countable, $P \in N, p \in N \cap P$, then there is a $(P, N)$-generic $q \geqq p$ (in $P$ ).
2.1. Notation. If $P ® Q$," $Q / P$ is..." is an abbreviation for: "for any generic set $G \subseteq P$, in $V[G], Q_{G}=\{q \in Q: q$ is compatible with every $p \in G\}$ is...".
2.2. Theorem. If each $P_{i}(i<\delta)$ is proper as well as $P_{j} / P_{i}(i<j<\delta)$ then their $\mathfrak{N}_{1}$-free limit $P=\mathrm{F} \lim _{i<\delta}^{\aleph_{1}} P_{i}$ is proper. Also $P / P_{i}$ is proper.

Remark. Similarly for $\mu$-proper by [10] terminology if we take $\mu^{+}$-free limit. We can restrict ourselves to non-limit $i, j$.

Proof. Let $N<(H(\chi), \in),\left\langle P_{i}: i<\delta\right\rangle \in N, \chi$ big enough (see [10] §3). Let $\left\{I_{n}: n<\omega\right\}$ be a list of all predense subsets of $P$ which belong to $N$. We have to prove $p \wedge \wedge_{n}\left(\vee_{a \in N \cap I_{n}} a\right) \in P$ (in BA terms: is not zero) ( $p$ any member of $P \cap N)$.

Now assume w.l.o.g. that everything is in some countable transitive model $M$. In the true world $V$ we can find $\alpha_{n}<\alpha_{n+1}, \delta \cap N=\bigcup_{n} \alpha_{n}$.

Let $\left\langle\Phi_{n}: n<\omega\right\rangle$ be a list of all countable (in $M$ ) subsets of $P$ which belongs to $N$.

We now define by induction on $n$, in $V, G_{n}, p_{n}$ such that:
(1) $G_{n} \subseteq P_{\alpha_{n}}, G_{n} \subseteq G_{n+1}$,
(2) $G_{n}$ is $P_{\alpha_{n}}$-generic for $M$ and $G_{n} \cap N$ is $\left(P_{\alpha_{n}} \cap N\right)$-generic for $N$,
(3) $p_{n} \leqq p_{n+1}, p=p_{0}, p_{n} \in N \cap P$,
(4) $p_{n}$ is compatible (in $P$ ) with every member of $G_{n}$,
(5) $p_{2 n+1}$ is $\geqq q_{n}$ for some $q_{n} \in I_{n}$,
(6) either $p_{2 n+2} \vdash \wedge \Phi_{n}$ or $p_{2 n+2} \vdash \neg r_{n}$ for some $r_{n} \in \Phi_{n}$.

The proof is trivial (provided you know about the composition forcings).
In the end $G=\bigcup_{n} G_{n}$ gives us a model of $\Lambda_{j<\delta} \theta\left[P_{j}\right]$ (by: members of $G$ are true, members of $\bigcup_{j<\delta} P_{j}-G$ are false).

For $r \in P \cap N, r$ is true in the model iff $p_{n} \geqq r$ for some $n$ (this is proved by induction on the complexity of $r$, (see conditions (4) and (6)). In the model $q_{n}$ is true, hence $\vee_{a \in I_{n} \cap N} a$ is true, hence $p \wedge \wedge_{n}\left(\vee_{a \in I_{n} \cap N} a\right)$ is true there ( $p$ true as $p_{0}=p$ ).

So in $V$ there is a model of $\Lambda_{j<\delta} \theta\left[P_{i}\right], p \wedge \wedge_{n}\left(\vee_{a \in I_{n} \cap N} a\right)$ so $p \wedge \wedge_{n}\left(\vee_{a \in I_{n} \cap N} a\right) \in P$ as required.

Remark. Part of the proof is essentially a repetition of the completeness theorem for $L_{\omega, \omega}$ (propositional calculus). But note that in this proof there was no need (as in the ones for inverse limit) to use names. Also, almost all previous theorems on preservation hold.
2.3. Definition. $\quad P_{i}, Q_{i}$ or $\left(\left\langle P_{i}, Q_{i}: i \leqq i_{0}\right\rangle\right)$ is an $\omega_{1}$ free iteration if (a) $P_{i}$ is $Q$-increasing, (b) $P_{i+1}=P_{i} * Q_{i}=\left\{\langle p, q\rangle: p \in P_{i}, \mathbb{H}_{p_{i}}{ }^{\prime} q \in Q_{i}{ }^{\prime}\right\},\langle p, q\rangle \leqq\left\langle p^{\prime}, q^{\prime}\right\rangle$ $\Leftrightarrow p \leqq p^{\prime} \wedge p^{\prime} \Vdash_{P} q \leqq q^{\prime}$; and we identify $p \in P_{i}$ with $\langle p, 0\rangle$, (c) for limit $\delta, P_{\delta}$ is the $\boldsymbol{N}_{1}$-free limit. [So $Q_{i_{0}}$ is not defined.]
2.4. Definition. We say that $\mathcal{N}_{1}$-free iteration preserves a property if whenever each $Q_{i}$ (in $V^{P_{i}}$ ) has it, then so does $P_{i b}$.

### 2.5. Theorem. Properness is preserved by $\boldsymbol{\aleph}_{1}$-free iteration.

Proof. See 2.2; and prove by induction on $\alpha$ that for $\beta<\alpha$,
(*) If $\left\langle P_{i}: i<i_{0}\right\rangle \in N<(H(\lambda), \in),\|N\|=\kappa_{0}, p \in P_{\beta}$, and for every predense $I \subseteq P_{\beta}, I \in N, I \cap N$ is predense above $p$, then for some $q \in P_{\alpha}$, for every predense $I \subseteq P_{\alpha}, I \in N, I \cap N$ is predense above $q$, and every $p^{\prime}, p \leqq p^{\prime} \in P_{\beta}$ is compatible with $q$ (and similarly if we restrict ourselves to forcing conditions $\geqq r, r \in N \cap P)$.

The following Definition and Theorem are not really necessary for the rest of the paper, but will help in understanding $\$ 4$.
2.6. Definition. $P$ is strongly proper if for large enough $\lambda$ (i.e. $\left.\lambda>\left(2^{|P|}\right)^{+}\right)$, $P \in N<(H(\lambda), \in),\|N\|=N_{0}, p \in P \cap N$ and $I_{n} \subseteq N$ predense in $N \cap P$ (but we do not ask $I_{n} \in N$ ), then for some $q, p \leqq q \in P$, each $I_{n}$ is predense above $q$.

### 2.7. Theorem. Strong properness is preserved by $\boldsymbol{\aleph}_{1}$-free iteration.

Proof. Let $\left\langle P_{i}, Q_{i}: i \leqq i_{0}\right\rangle$ be an $\aleph_{1}$-free iteration. We prove by induction on $\alpha \leqq i_{0}$ that for any $\beta<\alpha$ :
(*) Let $\left\langle P_{i}, Q_{i}: i \leqq i_{0}\right\rangle \in N<(H(\lambda), \in), \lambda>\left(2^{|P|}\right)^{+},\|N\|=\aleph_{0}, C$ a family of $\aleph_{0}$ predense subsets of $P_{\alpha} \cap N$, closed under the operation listed below. Suppose $\beta<\alpha, p \in P_{\alpha} \cap N, \alpha \in N, \beta \in N, q \in P_{\beta}$, no $q^{\prime}, q \leqq q^{\prime} \in P_{\beta}$ is incompatible with $p$, and $I \subseteq P_{\beta} \wedge I \in C \Rightarrow I$ predense above $q$. Then there is $q_{\alpha}, p \leqq q_{\alpha} \in P_{\alpha}$, $q \leqq q_{\alpha}$, no $q^{\prime}, q \leqq q^{\prime} \in P_{\beta}$ is incompatible with $q_{\alpha}$ and $I \in C \Rightarrow I$ predense above $q_{\alpha}$.
The operation under which $C$ is closed is
(Op1) $\mathrm{Op}_{1}(I, \gamma, p)=\left\{r: r \in P_{r}\right.$, and either for some $r^{*} \in I, r^{*} \geqq p$ and no $r^{\prime}$, $r \leqq r^{\prime} \in P_{\gamma}$ is incompatible with $r^{*}$ or $r$ is incompatible with $\left.p\right\}$
for $\gamma \in N, I \in C, p \in P_{\alpha}$. (Note that for $p=0$ the last phrase is vacuous.)
For $\alpha=0$. Totally trivial.
For $\alpha=\gamma+1$. So $\beta \leqq \gamma$, hence $\gamma \in N$ and by the induction hypothesis, for $\gamma$ ${ }^{(*)}$ holds, so w.l.o.g. $\beta=\gamma$. So we want to use the hypothesis $P_{\alpha}=P_{\gamma} * Q_{\gamma}, Q_{\gamma}$ is
strongly proper; then we use $\langle q, \underset{\sim}{r}\rangle, \underset{\sim}{r} \in Q_{\gamma}$ a name of an appropriate element of $Q_{r}$. But as $C$ is closed under ( Op 1 ) this is easy.
For $\alpha$ limit. Let $\alpha_{n} \in N, \bigcup_{\alpha_{n}}$ is $\alpha$ or at least $\left[\bigcup_{n} \alpha_{n}, \alpha\right) \cap N=\varnothing\left(\left[\alpha^{\prime}, \alpha\right)\right.$ interval of ordinals).

We work as in 2.2 using the induction hypothesis.
2.8. Claim. If we iterate $\omega$-proper, $\omega^{\omega}$-bounding forcings it does not matter whether we use $\kappa_{1}$-free iteration or countable support one (in the latter we get a dense subset of the first).

See [8, July]. The parallel of 2.7 for countable support was noted by Harrington and the author.

By the way we note that unlike $\kappa_{1}$-c.c. forcing
2.9. Example. There are proper forcings $P, Q$ such that $P \varangle Q$ but $Q / P$ is not proper.

Proof. We let $P_{0}=$ adding a subset $\underset{\sim}{r}$ of $\omega_{1}$ with a condition being a countable characteristic function.

Let $Q_{0} \in V^{P_{0}}, Q_{0}=\left\{f: \operatorname{Dom} f=\alpha<\omega_{1}\right.$, Range $f=\{0,1\}, f^{-1}(\{0\})$ is a closed set of ordinals included in $r$ \}. ( $r$ denotes the generic subset of $\omega_{1}$ which $P_{0}$ produces.)

Now $P_{0}, P_{0} * Q_{0}$ are proper but in $V^{P_{0}}, Q_{0} \cong P_{0} * Q_{0} / P_{0}$ is not proper. See [8, Sept., §5].

## 83. Aron. trees: various ways to specialize

We introduce variants of the notion "special Aron. tree" and prove some known theorems and some easy ones. See Baumgartner, Malitz and Reinhart [3] Baumgartner [1] and also Devlin and Shelah [4].
3.1. Definition. (1) An $\omega_{1}$-tree $T=\left(|T|,<_{T}\right)$ is a partially ordered set, such that (when no confusion arise, we write $<$ instead of $<_{T}$ and $T$ instead of $|T|$ ):
(a) for every $x \in T,\{y \in T: y<x\}$ is well-ordered, and its order type which is denoted by $r k(x)=r k_{T}(x)$, is countable,
(b) $T_{\alpha}=\{x \in T: r k(x)=\alpha\}$ is countable, $\neq \varnothing$,
(c) if $r k(x)=r k(y)$ is a limit ordinal then $x=y \Leftrightarrow\{z: z<x\}=\{z: z<y\}$,
(d) if $x \in T_{\alpha}, \alpha<\beta$, then for some $y \in T_{\beta}, x<y$, in fact there are at least two distinct such $y$ 's.

If we wave (c) and (d) we call it an almost $\omega_{1}$-tree; similarly for the other definitions.
(2) A set $B \subseteq T$ is a branch if it is totally ordered (hence well ordered); it is an $\alpha$-branch if it has order type $\alpha$.
(3) An Aron. tree is an $\omega_{1}$-tree with no $\omega_{1}$-branch.
(4) An $\omega_{1}$-tree is Souslin (or $\omega_{1}$-Souslin tree) if there is no uncountable antichain ( $=$ set of pairwise incomparable elements).

Remark. Condition 1(d) is not essential, except to make every Souslin tree an Aron. tree.
3.2. Definition. (1) For a set $S \subseteq \omega_{1}$ which is unbounded, we call an $\omega_{1}$-tree $S$-special if there is a monotonic increasing function $f$ from $\cup_{\alpha \in s} T_{\alpha}$ to $Q$ (the rationals), i.e., $x<y \Rightarrow f(x)<f(y)$.
(2) A special $\omega_{1}$-tree is an $\omega_{1}$-special $\omega_{1}$-tree (this is the classical notion).
(3) $r$-special, $S$ - $r$-special are defined similarly when the function is to $\mathbf{R}$ (the reals).
(4) We say $f$ specializes ( $S$-specialize, etc.) $T$. We can replace $S$ by a function $h$, Dom $h=\omega_{1}$, Range $h=S, h$ increasing.
3.3. Definition. For a stationary set $S \subseteq \omega_{1}$, we call an $\omega_{1}$-tree $S$-st-special if there is a function $f, \operatorname{Dom} f=\bigcup_{\alpha \in S-\{0\}} T_{\alpha}$, and $x \in T_{\alpha} \Rightarrow f(x) \in \alpha \times \omega$ (cartesian product) such that $x<y \Rightarrow f(x) \neq f(y)$ when defined. If $S$ is a set of limit ordinals we can assume $x \in T_{\alpha} \Rightarrow f(x) \in \alpha$.
3.4. Claim. (1) If $T$ is $S$-special or $S$ - $r$-special ( $S \subseteq \omega_{1}$ unbounded) or $S$-st-special ( $S \subseteq \omega_{1}$ stationary) $\omega_{1}$-tree then $T$ is an Aron. tree but not Souslin. Any $\omega_{1}$-Souslin tree is an Aron. tree.
(2) The following implications among properties of $\omega_{1}$-tree holds (where $S_{2} \subseteq S_{1} \subseteq \omega_{1}, \alpha(i) \in S_{1}$ increasing, $\left.S_{1}=\left\{\alpha(i): i<\omega_{1}\right\}\right):$
(a) $S_{1}$-special $\Rightarrow S_{2}$-special
$\Downarrow$
$S_{1}-r$-special $\Rightarrow S_{2}-r$-special
$\Downarrow$
$S_{1} \cap\left\{\alpha(i+1): i<\omega_{1}\right\}$-special,
(b) for $S_{1}$ stationary $S_{1}$-special $\Rightarrow S_{1}$-st-special,
(c) $S_{1}$-st-special $\Rightarrow S_{2}$-st-special,
(d) for $C \subseteq \omega_{1}$ closed unbounded $S_{1} \cap C$-st-special $\Rightarrow S_{1}$-st-special,
(e) if $(\forall i) h_{1}(i) \leqq h_{2}(i), T$ is $h_{1}$-special then $T$ is $h_{2}$-special.

Proof. Trivial: (1) for $S$-special $S$-r-special - well known for $S$-st-special by the Fodour theorem.
(2) Trivial - check.

Remark. By 2(d) dealing with $S$-st-special we can assume all members of $S$ are limit, and so Range $f \subseteq \omega_{1}$ in the Definition.
3.5. Claim. (1) $T$ is $S$-special iff $S \subseteq \omega_{1}$ is unbounded and there is $f: \bigcup_{\alpha \in S} T_{\alpha} \rightarrow \omega, x<y \wedge r k(x) \in S \wedge r k(y) \in S \Rightarrow f(x) \neq f(y)$.
(2) $T$ is $\omega_{1}$-st-special iff $T$ is special.

Remark. See Claim 3.11.

Proof. (1) Well known.
(2) The "if" part is trivial.

So suppose $f \omega_{1}-s t$-specialize $T$. For every $x \in T$, let $K_{x}=\{t \in(r k(x)+1) \times \omega$ : for no $y \leqq x$ is $f(y)=t\}$. We now define by induction on $\alpha<\omega_{1}, g_{\alpha}$ and $A_{x, t}$ $\left(t \in K_{x}, x \in \bigcup_{\beta<\alpha} T_{\beta}\right)$ such that
(a) $g_{\alpha}$ is a function from $T_{<\alpha}=\bigcup_{\beta<\alpha} T_{\beta}$ to $\omega$,
(b) $x<y, x \in T_{<\alpha}, y \in T_{<\alpha} \Rightarrow g_{\alpha}(x) \neq g_{\alpha}(y)$,
(c) $\beta<\alpha \Rightarrow g_{\beta} \subseteq g_{\alpha}$,
(d) $A_{x, t}$ (for $t \in K_{x}, x \in T_{<\alpha}$ ) is an infinite subset of $\omega$,
(e) for every $x \in T_{<\alpha}, t \neq s \in K_{x} \Rightarrow A_{x, t} \cap A_{x, s}=\varnothing$,
(f) $t \in K_{x}, x \in T_{<\alpha} \Rightarrow A_{x, t} \cap\left\{g_{\alpha}(y): y \leqq x\right\}=\varnothing$,
(g) if $x<y \wedge x \in T_{<\alpha} \wedge y \in T_{<\alpha}, t \in K_{x} \cap K_{y}$ then $A_{x, t}=A_{y, t}$.

For $\alpha=0, \alpha$ limit - no problem.
For $\alpha+1$ - let $x \in T_{\alpha} \subseteq T_{<(\alpha+1),}, s=f(x)$, so by $K$ 's definition for some $y<x$, $s \in K_{y}$. We choose $g_{\alpha+1}(x) \in A_{y, s}\left(=A_{z, t}\right.$ for every $\left.y \leqq z<x\right)$ and $A_{x, t}=A_{z, t}$ if $z<x \wedge t \in K_{z} \cap K_{x}$ and $g_{\alpha+1} \mid T_{<\alpha}=g_{\alpha}$.

If $t \in K_{x}-\bigcup_{z<x} K_{z}$ (there are $N_{0}$ such $t$ 's) we choose $A_{x, t} \subseteq A_{y, s}$ infinite pairwise disjoint and $g_{\alpha+1}(x) \notin A_{x, 1}$.

Now by 3.4(1) $g=\bigcup_{\alpha<\omega_{1}} g_{\alpha}$ shows $T$ is special.
3.6. Claim. (1) Let $S \subseteq \omega_{1}$ be unbounded. If every Aron. tree is $S$-special then every Aron. tree is special.
(2) if every Aron. tree is $S$-r-special then every Aron. tree is special.

Proof. (1) Let $T$ be an Aron. tree, $S=\left\{\alpha(i): i<\omega_{1}\right\}, \alpha(i)$ increasing.

Define $T^{*}$ (a partial order): The set of elements is $\left\{\langle x, \gamma\rangle: x \in T, \gamma \leqq \alpha\left(r k_{T}(x)\right)\right.$ and $\left.y<x \Rightarrow \alpha\left(r k_{T}(y)\right)<\gamma\right\}$; the order in $T^{*}$ is: $\langle x, \gamma\rangle<_{T^{*}}\left\langle x^{\prime}, \gamma^{\prime}\right\rangle$ if $x<x^{\prime}$ or $x=x^{\prime}, \gamma<\gamma^{\prime}$.

Now $T^{*}$ is almost an Aron. tree; the only missing part is in Definition 3.1, part (d) (in fact there are at least two distinct such $y$ 's). We can add more elements so that it becomes an Aron. tree, $T^{* *}$ and if $g^{* *} S$-specializes it, $g: T \rightarrow Q$, $g(x)=g^{* *}\left(\left\langle x, \alpha\left(r k_{T}(x)\right)\right\rangle\right)$ specializes $T$.
(2) By 3.5(1) and 3.4(2)(a).
3.7. Lemma. (1) $\left(\diamond_{\omega_{1}}\right)$ There is an $r$-special Aron. tree which is not special.
(2) Moreover there is no antichain $I$, s.t. $r k(I)=\{r k(x): x \in I\}$ contains a closed unbounded subset of $\omega_{1}$.
(3) $\left(\diamond_{\omega_{1}}^{*}\right)$ There is an $r$-special Aron. tree, such that for no antichain $I \subseteq T$ is $r k(I)=\{r k(x): x \in I\}$ stationary.

Remark. (1) was proved by Baumgartner [2].
Proof. We define by induction on $\alpha<\omega_{1}$ the tree ( $T_{<\alpha},<_{T} \mid T_{<\alpha}$ ) and $f: T_{<\alpha} \rightarrow R, x<y \Rightarrow f(x)<f(y)$ such that if $\beta<\gamma<\alpha, x \in T_{\beta}, \varepsilon$ a real positive number ( $>0$ ), then for some $y, x<y \in T_{\gamma}, f(y)<f(x)+\varepsilon$; and $x \in T_{\alpha+1} \Leftrightarrow f(x) \in Q$.

For $\alpha=0, \alpha$-successor of successor or $\alpha$ limit, no problem.
For $\alpha+1, \alpha$ limit, we are given antichains $I_{n}^{\alpha} \subseteq T_{<\alpha}(n<\omega)\left(\right.$ by $\diamond_{N_{1}}$ or $\left.\diamond_{\boldsymbol{N}_{1}}^{*}\right)$ and we can define $T_{<\alpha+1}$ such that
$(*)$ if $x \in T_{\alpha}, n<\omega$ and $\left\{y \in T_{<\alpha}: y<x\right\} \cap I_{n}^{\alpha}=\varnothing$ then for some $y<x$, and $\varepsilon>0, f(y)<f(x)<f(y)+\varepsilon$, and there is no $z, z \in I_{n}^{\alpha}, y<z \in T_{<\alpha}, f(y)<$ $f(z)<f(y)+\varepsilon$.

Now suppose $I \subseteq T$ is an antichain ( $T=\bigcup_{\alpha<\omega_{1}} T_{<\alpha}$ defined in the end). Let $C=\left\{\alpha<\omega_{1}: \alpha\right.$ limit, and if $x \in T_{<\alpha}, \varepsilon>0$, and there is $y \in I, x<y, f(x)<$ $f(y)<f(x)+\varepsilon$ then there is such $\left.y \in T_{<\alpha}\right\}$ be closed unbounded (note it suffices to consider $\varepsilon \in\{1 / n$ : $n$ positive natural number $\}$ ).

Now if $\alpha \in C, I \cap T_{<\alpha}=I_{n(0)}^{\alpha} \in\left\{I_{n}^{\alpha}: n<\omega\right\}, \alpha \in r k(I)$ then by (*) we get $I \cap T_{\alpha}=\varnothing$ (if $y \in I, y \in T_{\alpha}$, by $(*)\{z: z<y\} \cap I_{n(0)}^{\alpha} \neq \varnothing$; let $z$ be in it, then $z<y$ both in $I$, but $I$ is an antichain).

Now by defining $I_{n}^{\alpha}$ using $\diamond_{\omega_{1}}$ or $\diamond_{\omega_{1}}^{*}$ we get (1), (2) and (3).
3.8. CONCLUSION. Let $h$ be a function from $\omega_{1}$ to $\omega_{1}$. $\left(\diamond_{\boldsymbol{x}_{1}}^{*}\right)$ There is a tree $T$ which is $h_{1}$-special iff $\left\{i: h(i)<h_{1}(i)\right\}$ contains a closed unbounded subset of $\omega_{1}$ (see Definition 3.2(4)).
3.9. Lemma. Let $S \subseteq \omega_{1}$ be stationary, $\left(\diamond_{\omega_{1}-s}^{*}\right)$. There is an $S$-st-special tree which is $S_{1}$-st-special iff $S_{1}-S$ is not stationary; moreover there is no antichain $I$, $r k(I)-S$ stationary. (If $S=\omega_{1}$ we do not need any hypothesis, $\diamond_{\varnothing}^{*}$ is meaningless anyhow and this is the classical theorem on the existence of special Aron. trees of Aronszajn himself.) Also we can make the tree such that it is not $h$-special for any $h$.

Proof. (1) We define by induction on $\alpha<\omega_{1}, \quad\left(T_{<\alpha},<_{T} \mid T_{<\alpha}\right)$, $f: T_{<\alpha} \rightarrow \alpha \times \omega_{1} ; \quad x \in T_{<\alpha}-T_{0}, \quad r k(x) \in S \Rightarrow f(x) \in r k(x) \times \omega ; \quad x \in T_{0} \Rightarrow$ $f(x) \in\{0\} \times \omega=1 \times \omega, \quad r k(x) \in \omega_{1}-S \Rightarrow f(x) \in[r k(x)+1] \times \omega$ and $x<y \Rightarrow$ $f(x) \neq f(y)$, such that
(a) $x \in T_{\beta} \Rightarrow|\beta \times \omega-\{f(y): y<x\}|=\mathcal{N}_{0}$,
(b) if $x \in T_{\beta}, \beta<\gamma<\alpha,\{\langle\xi, n\rangle\} \cup A \subseteq((\beta+1) \times \omega-\{f(z): z<x\})$, $A$ finite, then there is $y \in T_{r}, x<y,\{f(z): z<y\} \cap A=\varnothing$ but $\langle\xi, n\rangle \in\{f(z): z<y\}$.

We can demand
(c) if $\alpha$ is limit, $\alpha \notin S$ then $\mid\left\{\alpha \times \omega-\{f(z): z<x\} \mid<\mathcal{N}_{0}\right.$.

There is no special problem.
3.10. Lemma. $\left(\diamond_{\omega_{1}}\right)$ There is a special Aron. tree $T$, such that for no antichain $I \subseteq T$ is $r k(I)$ closed unbounded. (For stationary: there is necessarily: this is mentioned in [4] p. 25.)

REmARK. E.g., MA $+2^{\kappa_{0}}>\boldsymbol{K}_{1}$ implies that this fails.

Proof. We define by induction on $\alpha,\left(T_{<\alpha},<_{T} \mid T_{<\alpha}\right) f: T_{<\alpha} \rightarrow Q$ monotonic, so that $\beta<\gamma<\alpha, x \in T_{\beta}, \varepsilon>0$ implies for some $y \in T_{\gamma}, x<$ $y \wedge f(x)<f(y)<f(x)+\varepsilon$. For limit $\delta<\omega_{1}$ we are given an antichain $I^{\alpha} \subseteq T_{<\alpha}$ (by $\diamond_{\kappa_{1}}$ ) and for $x \in T_{\alpha}$,
either

$$
\left(\exists y \in I^{\alpha}\right) y<x
$$

or

$$
(\exists y<x)\left[\text { there is no } z, y<z \in I^{\alpha}, f(z)<f(x) \in Q\right]
$$

The checking is easy.
3.11. Lemma. $T$ is $\left\{\alpha+1: \alpha<\omega_{1}\right\}$-special iff $T$ is $r$-special.

Remark. Proved by Baumgartner [2].

Proof. The direction $\Leftarrow$ already appears.
For $\Rightarrow$ let $f\left\{\alpha+1: \alpha<\omega_{1}\right\}$-specialize $T$.
Let $g: Q \rightarrow Q, \varepsilon: Q \rightarrow\{1 / n: n>0$ natural $\}$ be such that the intervals $[g(q)-\varepsilon(q), g(q)+\varepsilon(q)]$ are pairwise disjoint (possible: Let $Q=\left\{q_{n}: n<\omega\right\}$ and define by induction).
Now define $f^{*}: x \in T_{\alpha+1} \Rightarrow f^{*}(x)=g(f(x))$

$$
x \in T \alpha, \quad \alpha \text { limit } \Rightarrow f^{*}(x)=\sup \left\{g(f(y)): y<x, y \in T_{\beta+1}, \beta<\alpha\right\} .
$$

Now $f^{*} r$-specializes $T$; the only point to check is:

$$
x \in T_{\alpha+1}, \quad \alpha \operatorname{limit} \Rightarrow g(f(x))>\sup \left\{g(f(y)): y<x, y \in T_{\beta+1}, \beta+1<\alpha\right\}
$$

which follows by $g$ 's definition (the sup is $\leqq g(f(x))-\varepsilon(f(x))$ as for every $y<x$, $g(f(x))$ is smaller than it).

## §4. Independence results

It is well known that
4.1. Claim. If $T$ is an $\boldsymbol{N}_{1}$-Souslin tree, $\lambda>\boldsymbol{N}_{1}, N<(H(\lambda), \in), T \in N$, $x \in T_{\delta}, \delta=\omega_{1} \cap N$ then $B_{\mathrm{T}}(x)=\left\{y \in T_{<\delta}: y<x\right\}$ is generic for $(T, N)$, i.e., for every $I \in N, I \subseteq T$ which is predense

$$
I \cap B_{T}(x)=I \cap N \cap B_{T}(x) \neq \varnothing .
$$

4.2. Defintion. For an Aron. tree $T$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& Q(T)=\left\{(h, f): h \text { is a finite function from } \omega_{1} \text { to } \omega_{1} ;\right. \\
& \\
& \alpha<\beta \in \operatorname{Dom} h \Rightarrow \alpha \leqq h(\alpha)<\beta \leqq h(\beta) ; \\
& \\
& f \text { is a finite function, }
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \operatorname{Dom} f \subseteq \bigcup_{\alpha \in \operatorname{Domh}} T_{h(\alpha)} ; x \in T_{h(\alpha)} \Rightarrow f(x) \in \alpha \times \omega ; \\
& x<y \wedge x, y \in \operatorname{Dom} f \Rightarrow f(x) \neq f(y)\},
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
(h, f) \leqq\left(h^{\prime}, f^{\prime}\right) \quad \text { iff } \quad h \subseteq h^{\prime}, \quad f \subseteq f^{\prime} ;
$$

we let $(h, f) \cup\left(h^{\prime}, f^{\prime}\right)=\left(h \cup h^{\prime}, f \cup f^{\prime}\right), \quad(h, f) \cup h^{\prime}=\left(h \cup h^{\prime}, f\right)$,

$$
(h, f) \cup f^{\prime}=\left(h, f \cup f^{\prime}\right)
$$

4.3. Definition. For an Aron. tree $T$ and stationary set $S$,
$Q(T, S)=\{(h, f):(h, f) \in Q(T)$, and $\alpha \in(\operatorname{Dom} h) \cap(S-\{0\})$ implies $h(\alpha)=\alpha\}$, order - as before.

Explanation. Our aim is to get a universe in which SH (Souslin Hypothesis) holds (i.e., there is no Souslin tree) but not every Aron. tree is special. The question was raised by U. Avraham, and is natural as, until now, the consistency of SH was proved by making every Aron. tree special; see the proof of Solovay and Tennenbaum [12], Martin and Solovay [7], Baumgartner, Malitz and Reinhart [3] without CH, and Jensen proofs in Devlin and Johnsbraten [5] with CH . For this aim we introduce in $\S 3$ various notions of specializations (each implying the tree is not Souslin). So the program is to make every tree special in some weaker than usual sense. The notion $r$-special which had been introduced by Kurepe [6] is not suitable, as if every Aron. tree is $r$-special then every Aron. tree is $\left\{\alpha+1: \alpha<\omega_{1}\right\}$-special (see 3.4(a)), hence every Aron. tree is special (see 3.6). Similarly " $h$-special" for any increasing $h: \omega_{1} \rightarrow \omega$ is not suitable by 3.6 (see Definition 3.2(4)).

So a natural candidate is " $h$-special for some $h$ " (i.e., for every tree there is an $h$ for which it is $h$-special). Forcing by $Q(T)$ does the job for $T$ - we take generic $h$ and $f$. (It would be more natural to let $f$ go to $Q$ and be monotonically increasing, but by 3.5(2) the forcing $Q(T)$ makes $T h$-special for some $h$, and this way we have more uniformity with Definition 4.3.) So we should iterate such forcings, but retain some $T$ as not special.

A second way is to make each $T S$-st-special for some fixed stationary $S$; for this $Q(T, S)$ is tailored. (Note that the $f$ we get from a generic set of $Q(T, S)$ has domain $\bigcup_{\alpha \in S_{1}} T_{\alpha}$ where $S_{1} \subseteq S, S-S_{1}$ non-stationary.) For $S=\varnothing$ we get the previous case, so we shall ignore $Q(T)$.

This leads to a secondary problem: Can every Aron. tree be $S_{1}$-st-special, but some Aron. trees are not $S_{2}$-st-special ( $S_{2}-S_{1}$ stationary of course)? We answer positively.

### 4.4. Claim. For $T$ an Aron. tree, $S \subseteq \omega_{1}, Q(T, S)$ is proper.

Proof. We can assume w.l.o.g. $\left|T_{0}\right|=\boldsymbol{N}_{0}$.
Let $\lambda>\left(2^{\alpha_{1}}\right), N<(H(\lambda), \in), T, S, \in N, p_{0}=(h, f) \in Q(T, S) \cap N$, and let $\delta=N \cap \omega_{1}$.

Then $p_{1}=(h \cup\{\langle\delta, \delta\rangle\}, f) \in Q(T, S)$ exemplifies what is required.

For checking, we really repeat the proof that the standard forcing for specializing an Aron. tree satisfies the $\boldsymbol{N}_{1}$-c.c.
4.5. Defintion. We call a forcing $P,\left(T^{*}, S\right)$-preserving (do you have a better name?), where $T^{*}$ is Aron. tree, iff for every $\lambda>\left(2^{\left[P++\alpha_{1}\right.}\right)^{+}$, $\left\langle P, T^{*}, S\right\rangle \in N<(H(\lambda), \in), N$ countable, $\delta={ }^{\mathrm{df}} N \cap \omega_{1} \notin S, p \in N \cap P$, there is $p_{1}$ which is preserving for $\left(p, P, T^{*}, S\right)$; i.e.,
(i) $p \leqq p_{1} \in P$ and $p \leqq p^{\prime} \in P \cap N \Rightarrow p_{1}, p^{\prime}$ are compatible,
(ii) $p_{1}$ is $(P, N)$-generic ( $\equiv$ generic for $(P, N)$ ), i.e., for every predense $I \subseteq P$, $I \in N, I \cap N$ is predense above $p_{1}$,
(iii) for every $x \in T_{\delta}^{*}$, if
(*)

$$
x \in A \rightarrow(\exists y<x)(y \in A) \text { hold for every } A \subseteq T^{*}, A \in N,
$$

then
(**) for every $P$-name $\underset{\sim}{A}, \underset{\sim}{A} \in N \Vdash_{P} \underset{\sim}{A} \subseteq T^{*}$ the following holds:

$$
p_{1} \| " x \in \underset{\sim}{A} \rightarrow(\exists y<x) y \in \underset{\sim}{A} " .
$$

4.6. Lemma. If $T^{*}, T$ are Aron. trees, $S \subseteq \omega_{1}$, then $Q(T, S)$ is ( $T^{*}, S$ )preserving.

Remark. If $T^{*}$ is Souslin tree then (*) from Definition 4.5 is satisfied by every $x \in T_{\delta}^{*}$ (this follows by 4.1).

Proof. Let $N<(H(\lambda), \in), \delta={ }^{\mathrm{df}} N \cap \omega_{1} \notin S,\|N\|=\kappa_{0},\left\langle T^{*}, T, S\right\rangle \in N, p=$ ( $\left.h_{0}, f_{0}\right) \in P \cap N$ (as in Definition 4.5), and (remembering $\delta=N \cap \omega_{1}$ ) let

$$
\delta^{*}=\sup \left\{f(\delta)+1: f \in N, f(\delta) \text { an ordinal }<\omega_{1}\right\} .
$$

Define $p_{1}=\left(h_{0} \cup\left\{\left\langle\delta, \delta^{*}\right\rangle\right\}, f_{0}\right)$ and suppose $x \in T_{\delta}^{*}$ and
(*) if $A \subseteq T^{*}, A \in N, x \in A$ then $(\exists y)(y<x \wedge y \in A)$.
Let $\underset{\sim}{A}$ be a $Q(T, S)$-name of a subset of $T^{*}, \underset{A}{A} \in N$.
We shall prove that for every $p_{2}, p_{1} \leqq p_{2} \in Q(T, S)$, for some $p_{3}, p_{2} \leqq$ $p_{3} \in Q(T, S)$, and $p_{3} \Vdash x \notin \underset{\sim}{A}$ or $p_{2} \| y \in \underset{\sim}{A}$ for some $y<_{r} \cdot x$.

Let $p_{2}=\left(h_{2}, f_{2}\right)$, if $p_{2} \mathbb{H}_{p}$ " $x \notin \underset{\sim}{A}$ ", then we can choose $p_{3}=p_{2}$. Otherwise there is $p_{2}^{\prime} \in P$, such that

$$
p_{2} \leqq p_{2}^{\prime} \text { and } p_{2}^{\prime} \mathbb{H}_{p} \text { " } x \in \underset{\sim}{A} \text { ". }
$$

Let $p_{2}^{\prime}=\left(h_{2}^{\prime}, f_{2}^{\prime}\right), p_{2}=p_{2}^{a} \cup p_{2}^{b}, p_{2}^{a}=\left(h_{2}^{a}, f_{2}^{a}\right), p_{2}^{b}=\left(h_{2}^{b}, f_{2}^{b}\right)$ where $h_{2}^{a}=h_{2}^{\prime} \dagger \delta, h_{2}^{b}=$ $h_{2}^{\prime}\left\lceil\left[\delta, \omega_{1}\right)\right.$ (closed open interval) and

$$
f_{2}^{a}=f_{2}^{\prime}\left|T_{<\delta,} \quad f_{2}^{b}=f_{2}^{\prime}\right|\left(T-T_{<\delta}\right)
$$

Note that by the definition of $Q(T, S)$ :
FACT. (1) $p_{2}^{a} \in P \cap N$,
(2) $z \in \operatorname{Dom} f_{2}^{b} \Rightarrow r k(z) \geqq \delta^{*}$.

Now we define (in $H(\lambda), \in) \alpha_{0}=$ Max Range $h_{2}^{a}($ which is $<\delta)$ and we define a function $F$

$$
\operatorname{Dom} F=\left\{y \in T^{*}: r k(y)>\alpha_{0}\right\},
$$

$F(y)=\operatorname{Sup}\left\{\alpha^{*}<\omega_{1}:\right.$ there is $\left({ }^{*} h_{2,}^{b}{ }^{*} f_{2}^{b}\right)($ in $Q(T, S))$ such that:
(1) $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Dom} * h_{2}^{b}\right)=r k(y)$,
(2) ${ }^{*} h_{2}^{b}(r k(y))=\alpha^{*}$,
(3) $\left.\left(h_{2}^{a} \cup{ }^{*} h_{2}^{b}, f_{2}^{a} \cup{ }^{*} f_{2}^{b}\right) \mathbb{r}_{O(T, S)} " y \in \underset{\sim}{A}{ }^{\prime \prime}\right\}$
(so we demand also that $\left(h_{2}^{a} \cup^{*} h_{2}^{b}, f_{2}^{a} \cup^{*} f_{2}^{b}\right)$ is in $Q(T, S)$ ).
Now clearly $F \in N$ (as it is defined by a (first-order) formula in ( $H(\lambda), \in$ ) whose parameters are in $N$ ). Clearly $F(y) \leqq \omega_{1}$ (for $y \in T^{*}-T_{s_{\alpha_{0}}}^{*}$ ). Let $A^{*}=\left\{y \in T^{*}: r k(y)>\alpha_{0}, F(y)=\omega_{1}\right\}$. (Note that $A^{*} \subseteq T^{*}$ is a set, not a $P$-name of a set.)
Let $F^{*}$ be a function from $\omega_{1}$ to $\omega_{1}$ defined by:

$$
F^{*}(\alpha)=\operatorname{Sup}\left\{F(y)+1: y \in T_{s_{\alpha} \alpha}^{*}, r k(y)>\alpha_{0}, y \notin A^{*} \text {, i.e., } F(y)<\omega_{1}\right\} .
$$

As $\left|T_{s \alpha}^{*}\right| \leqq N_{0}, F^{*}: \omega_{1} \rightarrow \omega_{1}$, and clearly $F^{*} \in N$ (same reason).
By the definition of $\delta^{*}, F^{*}(\delta)<\delta^{*}$. But $\left(h_{2}^{b}, f_{2}^{b}\right)$ exemplify $F(x) \geqq \delta^{*}$, so necessarily $F(x)=\omega_{1}$. So by definition $x \in A^{*}$. Hence by the hypothesis (*) there is $y<_{r} \cdot x, y \in A^{*}$. So (in $H(\lambda)$, hence in $N$ ) we can define a sequence $\bar{p}=\left\langle\left(h_{2}^{b, i}, f_{2}^{b, i}\right): i<\omega_{1}\right\rangle$ such that
(1) $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Dom} h_{2}^{\text {b. }}\right)=r k(y)$,
(2)' $\left.h_{2}^{b,(r k}(y)\right) \geqq \alpha_{0}+i$,
(3)" $\left(h_{2}^{a} \cup h_{2}^{b, i}, f_{2}^{a} \cup f_{2}^{b, i}\right) \Vdash_{O(\tau, S)} " y \in A "$.

For $i<\delta$ let $p_{3}^{i}=\left(h_{2}^{a} \cup h_{2} \cup h_{2}^{b, i}, f_{2}^{a} \cup f_{2} \cup f_{2}^{b, i}\right)$. If $p_{3}^{i} \in Q(T, S)$ then by ( 3$)^{\prime}$ it is as required.
Why can $p_{3}^{i}$ be not in $Q(T, S)$ ? The first coordinate $\left(h_{2}^{a} \cup h_{2} \cup h_{2}^{b, i}\right)$ is $O . K$., as $h_{2}^{b, i} \in N$.
What about the second? Note $f_{2}^{a} \cup f_{2}, f_{2}^{a} \cup f_{2}^{b, i}$ are O.K. as $p_{2} \in Q(T, S)$ and by (3)' above correspondingly. Hence the only danger is that there are $z_{1} \in \operatorname{Dom} f_{2}^{b}$,
$z_{2} \in \operatorname{Dom} f_{2}^{b, i}, \quad z_{2}<_{T} z_{1} \quad$ (as $f_{2}^{b, i} \in N, r k z_{1} \geqq h_{2}^{b}(\delta)=\delta^{*}$ this is the only bad possibility).

But remember (in $H(\lambda)$ ) $z \in \operatorname{Dom} f_{2}^{b, i} \Rightarrow r k z \geqq i$, so by a lemma on Aron. trees due to Baumgartner, Malitz and Reinhart (in their proof of MA $⺊$ "every Aron. tree is special') there is a sequence $\left\langle i_{n}: n<\omega\right\rangle\left(i_{n}<\omega_{1}\right)$ such that

$$
m \neq n \wedge z_{1} \in \operatorname{Dom} f_{2}^{b, i_{m}} \wedge z_{2} \in \operatorname{Dom} f_{2}^{b, i_{n}} \Rightarrow\binom{z_{1} \nless z_{2}}{z_{2} \nless z_{1}}
$$

So again there is such a sequence in $N$, and all but at most $\left|\operatorname{Dom} f_{2}^{b}\right|$ are O.K., i.e., $p_{3}^{i} \in Q(T, S)$. So we finish.
4.7. Theorem. Let $T^{*}$ be a Souslin tree. Suppose $P_{\alpha}\left(\alpha \leqq \alpha_{0}\right), Q_{\alpha}\left(\alpha<\alpha_{\delta}\right)$ form an $\mathcal{N}_{1}$-free iteration (i.e., $P_{\alpha+1}=P_{\alpha} * Q_{\alpha}, P_{\delta}=\mathrm{F} \lim _{\alpha<\delta}^{\boldsymbol{N}_{1}} P_{\alpha}$ ) and for every $\alpha$ at least one of the following holds:
$(\alpha) Q_{\alpha}$ is (in $\left.V^{P_{\alpha}}\right)\left(T^{*}, S\right)$-preserving,
( $\beta$ ) there is an antichain $I_{\alpha} \subseteq T^{*}$ (in $V^{P_{\alpha}}$ ), $S_{\alpha}=r k\left(I_{\alpha}\right)=\{r k(x): x \in I\} \subseteq$ $\omega_{1}-S$, and

$$
\begin{aligned}
Q_{\alpha}=Q_{\mathrm{club}}\left(\omega-S_{\alpha}\right)= & \left\{g: \text { for some } i<\omega_{1}, \text { Dom } g=i+1, \operatorname{Range}(g)=\{0,1\},\right. \\
& \left.\{j \leqq i: g(i)=1\} \text { is closed and is } \subseteq \omega_{1}-S_{\alpha}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Then $P_{a_{0}}$ is $\left(T^{*}, S\right)$-preserving.

Remark. We can amalgamate conditions ( $\alpha$ ) and ( $\beta$ ) but it has no use.

Proof. We prove by induction on $\alpha$ the following:
$(+)_{\alpha}$ Suppose $\beta<\alpha, N<(H(\lambda), \in), \beta \in N, \alpha \in N,\left\langle P_{i}: i \leqq \alpha\right\rangle \in N, \delta=$ $N \cap \omega_{1} \notin S, p \in P_{\alpha} \cap N, q_{1} \in P_{\beta},\left\langle I_{i}: i<\alpha, I_{i}\right.$ defined $) \in N$ and
(i) $p \upharpoonright \beta \leqq q_{1}$ (meaning no $q^{\prime}, q_{1} \leqq q^{\prime} \in P_{\beta}$ is incompatible with $p$; if we deal with complete $\mathrm{BA}, p \backslash \beta$ is the projection). Moreover if $p \backslash \beta \leqq p^{\prime} \in P_{B} \cap N$, then $q_{1}, p^{\prime}$ are compatible;
(ii) $q_{1}$ is $\left(P_{\beta}, N\right)$-generic (see in Definition 2.1);
(iii) if $x \in T_{\delta}^{*}$ and $\left(\forall A \subseteq T^{*}\right)(A \in N \wedge x \in A \rightarrow(\exists y<x) y \in A)$ then for every $P_{\beta}$-name $\underset{\sim}{A} \in N, q_{1} H_{p_{\beta}} " x \in \underset{\sim}{A} \rightarrow\left(\exists y<_{T} * x\right) y \in \underset{\sim}{A} "$ ".

Then there is $p_{1} \in P_{\alpha}$ such that
(i) $p_{1} \mid \beta=q_{i}$ (natural meaning) and $p \leqq p^{\prime} \in P_{\alpha} \cap N, q_{1} \leqq q^{\prime} \in P_{\beta} ; q^{\prime}, p^{\prime} \mid \beta$ compatible implies $p^{\prime}, p_{1}, q^{\prime}$ are compatible ( $=$ has an upper bound),
(ii)' $p_{1}$ is $\left(P_{\alpha}, N\right)$-generic,
(iii) the parallel of (iii) with $\beta \mapsto \alpha, q_{1} \mapsto p_{1}$.
$\alpha=0$. Trivial.
$\alpha+1$. By the similarity between the assumptions on $q_{1}$ and the conclusion on $p_{1}$, we can assume w.l.o.g. $\beta=\alpha$. Let $G \subseteq P_{\alpha}$ be generic $q_{1} \in G$. Then $N[G]<(H(\lambda)[G], \in)$ (see e.g. [8]).

Now in $V[G]$ (hence in $H(\lambda)[G])$ we can find $p_{1}^{\prime} \geqq p(\alpha),\left(N[G], Q_{\alpha}\right)$-generic, as in Definition 4.5. Why? We have two cases $(\alpha)$ and $(\beta)$ from the theorem:
( $\alpha$ ) Straightforward, by 4.6.
( $\beta$ ) By the choice of $T^{*}$ (Souslin) by Claim 4.1, $x \in A \in N$ and $x \in T_{8}^{*} \Rightarrow \mid$ $(\exists y<x) y \in A$. So by the assumption on $q_{1}$ for every $A \in V[G], A \subseteq T^{*}$, $A \in N[G]$, of course there is a $P_{\alpha}$-name $\underset{\sim}{A}$ so $q_{1} \mathbb{P}_{P_{a}}$ " $x \in \underset{\sim}{A} \rightarrow(\exists y<x) y \in$ $A_{\sim}^{\prime}$, hence in $V[G], x \in A \cap T_{\delta}^{*} \Rightarrow(\exists y<x) y \in A$.

In particular we can take $A=I_{\alpha} \in N[G]$ (remember $I_{\alpha} \in V^{p_{\alpha}} \cdots$ ). So clearly if $x \in T_{\delta}^{*} \cap I_{\alpha}$ then $x \in A$ implies $I_{\alpha}$ is not an antichain, contradiction. So $T_{\delta}^{*} \cap I_{\alpha}=\varnothing$, so $\delta \notin S_{\alpha}=r k\left(I_{\alpha}\right)$, and then the desired conclusion is immediate (remember $Q_{\alpha}$ 's definition).

So we have $p_{1}^{\prime}$ as required. $p_{1}^{\prime}$ is in $V^{P_{\alpha}}$, so in $V$ we have a $P_{\alpha}$-name $p_{1}^{\prime}$ for it, and let $p_{1}=\left(q_{1}, p_{1}^{\prime}\right) \in P_{\alpha} * Q_{\alpha}$ which by the usual thing for composition of forcing, is as required.
$\alpha$ limit. Let $\alpha \cap N=\bigcup_{n} \alpha_{n}, \beta=\alpha_{1}<\cdots<\alpha_{n}<\alpha_{n+1}<\cdots ; \alpha_{n} \in N$.
We define by induction on $n<\omega, n \geqq 1, q_{n} \in P_{\alpha_{n}}, q_{n+1} \mid \alpha_{n}=q_{n}$, each $q_{n}$ satisfies the hypothesis of the theorem with $\alpha_{n}$ replacing $\beta$.

For $\underset{\sim}{A}$ a $P_{\alpha}$-name of a subset of $T^{*}, \underset{\sim}{A} \in N, r \in P_{\alpha} \cap N$, let

$$
\begin{aligned}
A\left[\alpha_{n}, r\right]= & \left\{y \in T^{*}: \text { if } r \text { is compatible with every element of } \underset{\alpha_{n}}{ }\right. \\
& \left(=\text { the generic set of } P_{\alpha_{n}}\right) \text { then for some } r^{\prime}, r<r^{\prime} \in P_{\alpha}, \\
& r^{\prime} \text { compatible with every element of } G_{\alpha_{n}} \text { and } \\
& \left.r^{\prime} \mathbb{I}_{P_{a}} " y \in \underset{\sim}{\prime \prime}\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

(we could have used $P_{\alpha} / P_{\alpha_{n}}$ ).
Let $\left.\left\langle{\underset{\sim}{A}}_{n}, x_{n}\right): n<\omega\right\rangle$ be a list of all pairs $(\underset{\sim}{A}, x), \underset{\sim}{A}$ a $P_{\alpha}$-name of a subset of $T^{*}$, $x \in T_{\delta}$ and $\underset{\sim}{A}, x$ are in $N ;\left\langle I_{n}: n<\omega\right\rangle$ be a list of all predense subsets of $P_{\alpha}$ which belong to $N$. Let

$$
\begin{gathered}
p_{1}=p \wedge \wedge_{n}^{\wedge} q_{n} \wedge \wedge_{n}\left(\underset{r \in I_{n}}{\wedge} r\right) \wedge \wedge_{n<\omega}^{\wedge}\left[\vee\left\{p \in P_{\alpha} \cap N: p \Vdash y \in{\underset{\sim}{A}}_{n} \text { for some } y<_{t} \cdot x_{n}\right\} \vee\right. \\
\vee \vee\left\{q_{n} \wedge \wedge_{r \in J} r: J \subseteq N \cap P_{\alpha}, J \text { is definable in }(N,\{y: y<x\})\right. \text { and } \\
\left.q_{n} \wedge \wedge_{r \in J} r \mathbb{F}_{P_{a}} " x_{n} \notin{\underset{\sim}{A}}_{n}^{\prime \prime}\right\} .
\end{gathered}
$$

There are two facts on $p_{1}$ we have to prove:
(A) $p_{1} \in P_{\alpha}=F \lim _{i<\alpha}^{\alpha_{1}} P_{i}$, i.e., $\wedge_{i<\alpha} \theta\left[P_{i}\right] \nvdash p_{1}$ (as clearly $p_{1}$ has the right form), (B) (i)', (ii)', (iii)' hold.

For proving both facts we do the following. We assume everything is in some countable transitive model $M$ (or $M \Rightarrow V, V \Rightarrow V^{*}$, in $V^{*}\left|H(\lambda)^{v}\right|$ is countable which is easy by forcing).

Let $p^{\prime}, q^{\prime}$ be as in (i)'.
We let $G_{\alpha_{0}} \subseteq P_{\alpha_{0}}=P_{\beta}$ be generic (i.e., $M$-generic and $p^{\prime} \mid \beta^{\prime}, q^{\prime} \in G_{\alpha_{0}}$ ).
We shall find $G \subseteq P_{\alpha_{n}}$ such that $G \cap P_{\alpha_{n}}$ is generic (for $M, P_{\alpha_{n}}$ ), and the truth values it gives to all $p \in \bigcup_{n<\omega} P_{\alpha_{n}}$ make $p_{1} \wedge p^{\prime}$ true (so we have, in $V$, a model of $\wedge_{i<\alpha} \theta\left[P_{i}\right] \vdash \neg p_{1} \wedge p^{\prime}(=$ fact (A)).
As for fact (B), fact (B)(ii)' holds trivially by the definition of $p_{1}$ (i.e., $\wedge_{n}\left(\vee_{r \in I_{n}} r\right)$ ). Similarly the last conjunct takes care of (B)(iii)'.

The second phrase of (B)(i)' holds by the free choice of $p^{\prime}, q^{\prime}$ (and the way $G_{\alpha_{0}}$, $G$ are chosen), hence $p_{1} \mid \beta=q_{1}$; the other inequality follows by $p_{1}$ 's definition.
We define by induction $G_{n}, p_{n}$ s.t. (like 2.2)
(1) $G_{n} \subseteq P_{a_{n}}, G_{n} \subseteq G_{n+1}$,
(2) $G_{n}$ is $P_{\alpha_{n}}$-generic for $M$,
(3) $p_{n} \leqq p_{n+1}, p=p^{\prime}, p_{n} \in P_{\alpha} \cap N$,
(4) $p_{n}$ is compatible (in $P_{\alpha}$ ) with every member of $G_{n}, q_{n} \in G_{n}$,
(5) $p_{3 n+1}$ is $\geqq q_{n}^{\prime}$ for some $q_{n}^{\prime} \in I_{n} \cap N$,
(6) $p_{3 n+2} \vdash \wedge \Phi_{n}$ or $p_{3 n+2} \vdash \neg r_{n}$ for some $r_{n} \in \Phi_{n}$, where $\left\langle\Phi_{n}: n<\omega\right\rangle$ is a list of all countable $\Phi \subseteq P, \Phi \in N$,
(7) in $M\left[G_{n}\right]$ for every $A \in N\left[G_{n}\right], A \subseteq T^{*}, x \in T_{\delta}^{*}, \wedge x \in A \rightarrow(\exists y<x)$ holds ( $q_{n} \in G_{n}$ do the job),
(8) $p_{3 n+3} \|_{P_{\alpha}}$ " $\left(\exists y<x_{k}\right) y_{\alpha} \in A_{n}$ " or $q_{3 n+3} \wedge \wedge_{r \in J} r \|$ " $x \notin A_{n}$ ", for some $J-$ $\left\{p_{\left.3_{n+3}\right\}} \subseteq G_{n+1}, J\right.$ definable in ( $N,\left\{y: y<_{\tau} \cdot x_{n}\right\}$ ).

As in the proof of 2.2 , this suffices. The only non-trivial part in the definition is taking care of (8). So let $n=3 k+2, p_{n}, G_{n}$, be defined, and we shall define $p_{n+1}$, $\boldsymbol{G}_{n+1}$. We define
${\underset{\sim}{k}}_{k}^{\prime}=\left\{y \in T^{*}\right.$ : there is $r \in P_{\alpha}, r \geqq p_{r}$, which is compatible with every member of ${\underset{\sim}{n+1}}^{\boldsymbol{A}_{n}}\left(=\right.$ the name of the generic subset of $\left.P_{a_{n+1}}\right)$ such that $r \Vdash_{P_{s}}$ " $y \notin{\underset{\sim}{k}}_{k}$ " $\}$.

Clearly $\underset{\sim}{A}$ is a $P_{\alpha_{n+1}}$-name (as we use ${\underset{\sim}{n+1}}$ in the definition) and if $p_{n+1}\left\lceil\alpha_{n+1} \leqq\right.$ $r \in P_{\alpha_{n+1}}$ then

$$
\begin{equation*}
r \Vdash_{P_{a_{n+1}}} " y \notin \underset{\sim}{A_{k}^{\prime}} \prime \prime \text { implies } r \Vdash_{P_{o_{n+1}}} " y \notin \underset{\sim}{A_{k}} " . \tag{*}
\end{equation*}
$$

However the inverse implication does not follow. Now if we can choose $p_{n+1}$, such that $p_{n} \leqq p_{n+1} \in P_{\alpha} \cap N, p_{n+1}$ compatible with every member of $G_{n}$ (equival-
ently of $G_{n} \cap N$ ) such that $p_{n+1} \mathbb{H}_{P_{\alpha}}$ " $y \in{\underset{\sim}{k}}^{\prime}$ " for some $y<_{T}$. $x_{n}$, then we can proceed to define $G_{n+1}$ with no problem.

We assume that there is no such $p_{n+1}$ and let $p_{n+1}=p_{n}$. Let

Clearly $J$ is definable in $\left(N,\left\{y: y<_{T^{*}} x_{k}\right\}\right), J \subseteq P_{\alpha} \cap N$, so it is enough to prove $\boldsymbol{q}_{n+1} \wedge \wedge_{r \in J} r \mathbb{H}_{P_{\alpha}} " x_{k} \notin \underset{\sim}{\boldsymbol{A}_{k}} "$.

Now ${\underset{\sim}{k}}_{k}^{\prime}$ is a $P_{\alpha_{n+1}}$-name of a subset of $T^{*}$, so by the choice of $q_{n+1}$

$$
q_{n+1} \mathbb{P}_{P_{x_{n+1}}} " x_{n} \in \underset{k}{\underset{k}{\prime} \rightarrow\left(\exists y \ll_{T} \cdot x_{k}\right) y \in \underset{\sim}{A} \prime \prime} \text { ". }
$$

However for each $y \ll_{T^{*}} x_{k}$,

$$
I_{y}=\left\{r \in P_{a_{n+1}}: r \Vdash_{P_{o_{n+1}}} \text { "y } y \in \underset{\sim}{A}{ }_{k}^{\prime} " \text { or } y \Vdash_{P_{a_{n+1}}} " y \notin{\underset{\sim}{k}}_{\prime}^{\prime} "\right\}
$$

is a subset of $P_{\alpha_{n+1}}$ hence $I_{y} \cap N$ is predense above $q_{n+1}$ (in $P_{\alpha_{n+1}}$ ) (as $y \in N$ ). So $q_{n+1}$ forces that if $y \in \underset{\sim}{A} \underset{k}{\prime}\left(y<_{\tau^{*}} x_{k}\right)$ then some $r \in I_{y} \cap N$ is in the generic subset of $P_{\alpha_{n+1}}$. Hence $q_{n+1} \wedge p_{n} \in P_{\alpha}$ forces that: if $x_{k} \in \underset{\sim}{A}$, then necessarily $x_{k} \in \underset{\sim}{A}{ }_{k}^{\prime}$ (see (*)) hence some $y<_{T^{*}} x_{k}$ is in $\underset{\sim_{k}^{\prime}}{\prime}$. Hence some $r \in I_{y} \cap N$ for which $r \|_{P_{\alpha_{n+1}}}$ " $y \in \underset{\sim}{\underset{\sim}{A}} \prime$ " is in the generic set, clearly $\neg r \in J$. So clearly (as $p_{n} \in J$ ) $q_{n+1} \wedge \wedge_{r \in J} r$ forces that $x_{k} \in \underset{\sim}{A}{\underset{k}{k}}^{A}$ leads to a contradiction (as $r$ and $x$ are incompatible) so it forces $x_{k} \in \underset{\sim}{A_{k}}$.

As we have assumed there is no $p_{n+1}, p_{n} \leqq p_{n+1} \in P_{\alpha} \cap N, p_{n+1}$ compatible with every member of $G_{n}$ such that $p_{n+1} \mathbb{H}_{P_{a_{n}}}$ " $y \in{\underset{\sim}{A}}_{\boldsymbol{k}}$ " for some $y<_{\boldsymbol{r}}$. $x_{k}$, clearly if $G_{n+1} \subset P_{\alpha_{n+1}}$, generic for $M, G_{n} \subset G_{n+1}, q_{n+1}, p_{n} \mid \alpha_{n+1} \in G_{n}$ then $r \in J \Rightarrow r \in G_{n+1}$. So finish proving (8) hence the theorem.
4.8. Conclusion. If ZFC is consistent so is: ZFC+every Aron. tree is $S$-st-special, but some Aron. tree $T^{*}$ is not $S^{*}$-st-special for any $S^{*} \subseteq \omega_{1}-S$ stationary ( $S$ is co-stationary - otherwise it is not interesting, but there is no other restriction).

Proof. Trivial by the previous Theorem 4.6, 4.7, but note that for ensuring $T^{*}$ remains an Aron. tree we had better start the iterated forcing by $Q\left(T^{*}, S\right)$, as for the $\aleph_{2}$-chain condition, see [8]. Remember also that our forcings are proper and proper forcing preserves stationarity of subsets of $\omega_{1}$ (see [8]).

Concluding Remarks. (1) We can ask: can we do it with G.C.H. and can we get independence of other variants of "every Aron. tree is non-Souslin, special,
etc." but we have not tried. For G.C.H. it is natural to use a variant of the forcing used in [8] for the consistency of G.C.H. + SH with ZFC.
(2) By the definition of the forcing $Q(T, S)$; and by $3.5(2)$ (applied to an almost subtree), in 4.8 we get that every Aron. tree is $S^{\prime}$-special for some $S^{\prime}$ (the range of the generic $h$ ). So for $S$ empty, we get: every Aron. tree is $S^{\prime}$-special for some $S^{\prime}$ (equivalently $h$-special for some $h: \omega_{1} \rightarrow \omega_{1}$ ) but some tree is not $S^{*}$-stspecial for any stationary $S^{*} \subseteq \omega_{1}$.
(3) If we use also case ( $\beta$ ) in 4.7 , we can strengthen the conclusion of 4.8 to: for no antichain $I \subseteq T^{*}$ is $r k(I)-S$ stationary (by adding a closed unbounded subset of $\omega_{1}$ disjoint to any such $\left.r k(I)-S\right)$.
(4) Avraham noted that " $T$ is $h$-special for some $h$ " is equivalent to " $T$ is $S$ - $r$-special for some closed unbounded $S \subseteq \omega_{1}$ ". Note that we can define $S-P$-special for every partial order $P$, and if $\alpha_{i} \in P\left(i<\omega_{1}\right)$ implies $\left(\exists i<j<\omega_{1}\right)$ $\alpha_{i} \leqq \alpha_{j}$ then " $T S$ - $P$-special" implies " $T$ is not Souslin". Note also that " $S$ - $r$-special for some closed unbounded $S$ " implies $\omega_{1}-\mathbf{R} \times \mathbf{Q}$-special $[\mathbf{R}-$ reals, $\mathbf{Q}$ - rationals, the order - lexicographic). So we have proved, e.g., "every Aron. tree is $\omega_{1}-R \times Q$ special" does not imply "every Aron. tree is special".
(5) We can also try to get a model of ZFC where, e.g., (1) (for some stationary co-stationary $S \subseteq \omega_{1}$ ) every Aron. tree is $S$ - $s t$-special, but some Aron. tree $T^{*}$ is not $h$-special for any $S$; or (2) there is no Souslin tree but some Aron. tree is not $h$-special for any $h$. For (1) it is natural to define $Q(T, S)=\{(h, f)$ : $\left.(h, f) \in Q(T, S), \operatorname{Dom} f \subseteq \bigcup_{h(\alpha)=\alpha} T_{\alpha}\right\}$. But $T$ is the union of $\aleph_{0}$ disjoint copies of $T^{*}$, so $Q(T, S)$ makes $T^{*} h$-special for some $S$.

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Institute of Mathematics
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel


[^0]:    ${ }^{+}$The result was announced in [9].
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