Choiceless polynomial time

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Abstract

Turing machines define polynomial time (PTime) on strings but cannot deal with structures like graphs directly, and there is no known, easily computable string encoding of isomorphism classes of structures. Is there a computation model whose machines do not distinguish between isomorphic structures and compute exactly PTime properties? This question can be recast as follows: Does there exist a logic that captures polynomial time (without presuming the presence of a linear order)? Earlier, one of us conjectured a negative answer. The problem motivated a quest for stronger and stronger PTime logics. All these logics avoid arbitrary choice. Here we attempt to capture the choiceless fragment of PTime. Our computation model is a version of abstract state machines (formerly called evolving algebras). The idea is to replace arbitrary choice with parallel execution. The resulting logic expresses all properties expressible in any other PTime logic in the literature. A more difficult theorem shows that the logic does not capture all of PTime. © 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The standard computation model is Turing machines, whose inputs are strings. However, in combinatorics, database theory, etc., inputs are naturally structures (graphs,

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databases, etc.) indistinguishable up to isomorphism. In such cases, there is a problem with a string presentation of input objects: there is no known, easily computable string encoding of isomorphism classes of structures. This calls for a computation model that deals with structures directly rather than via string encoding. There are several such computation models in the literature, in particular relational machines [3] and abstract state machines (formerly called evolving algebras) [13].

The natural question is whether there is a computation model that captures PTime over structures (rather than strings). In different terms, essentially the same question has been raised in [6]. Gurevich translated Chandra–Harel's question as a question of existence of a logic that captures PTime and conjectured that no such logic exists [12]. We address this issue in Section 3; here it suffices to say that the notion of logic is a very broad one and includes computation models.

If one seriously entertains the possibility that there is no logic that captures PTime, the question arises how much of PTime can be captured by a coherent logic or computation class. Here we define a natural fragment of PTime captured by means of a version of abstract state machines (ASMs). We call the fragment Choiceless Polynomial Time (C̃PTime). The idea is to eliminate arbitrary choice by means of parallel execution.

Consider for example the Graph Reachability problem: Given a graph $G = (V, E)$ with distinguished nodes s and t (an allusion to Source and Target, respectively), decide whether there is a path from s to t in G.

A common reachability algorithm constructs the set X of all vertices reachable from s and then checks if X contains t. To construct X, an auxiliary "border-set" $Y \subseteq X$ is used.

```
if Mode = Initial then
    X, Y := {s}, Mode := Construct
endif

if Mode = Construct then
    if Y ≠ ∅ then
        choose y ∈ Y
            let Z = {z ∈ V − X : yEz}
                X := X ∪ Z
                Y := (Y − {y}) ∪ Z
            endlet
        endchoose
    else Mode := Examine
    endif
endif

if Mode = Examine then
    if t ∈ X then Output := Yes else Output := No endif
    Halt := True
```

```
   Mode := Final
endif
```

If a given graph G comes with an order on vertices, the order can be used to eliminate choice, but we are interested in structures which are not necessarily ordered. In the case of the reachability problem, choice can be eliminated by means of parallelism. Here is a revised version of the second transition rule from the program above.

```
if Mode = Construct then
    if Y ≠ ∅ then
        let Z = {z ∈ V − X : (∃y ∈ Y) yEz}
            X := X ∪ Z
            Y := Z
        endlet
    else Mode := Examine
    endif
endif
```

Of course, one is not always so lucky. In Section 10, we describe a well-known PTime algorithm for the Perfect Matching problem. The algorithm uses choice and, as far as we know, there is no choiceless PTime algorithm for Perfect Matching.

Our computation model is explained in Section 4 and our formalization ČPTime of Choiceless PTime is given in Section 5. ČPTime is a computation model, but it can be viewed as a (very generalized) logic. Abusing notation, we will use the term ČPTime to denote not only our computation model but also the portion of PTime captured by the model. In Section 7, we show that the ČPTime logic is more expressive than the logic whose "formulas" are Abiteboul–Vianu's relational machines. It expresses also all properties computable by Abiteboul–Vianu's (strongly coupled) generic machines. It appears that, in fact, the expressive power of ČPTime on finite structures matches that of Abiteboul–Vianu's generic machines. Details about these and related systems will appear in a forthcoming paper by the first two authors and Jan van den Bussche.

The ČPTime syntax is richer than the syntax associated to generic machines. In particular, ČPTime allows direct use of sets of arbitrary finite type over the input structure, not only relations. It has basic set-theoretic operations built in. Also, ČPTime includes most of the programming constructs of abstract state machines, a powerful and natural model of computation.

In Section 10, we show that ČPTime does not express the parity of a naked set or the perfect matchability of a bipartite graph where the parts are of the same size.

Viewed as a logic, ČPTime is naturally three-valued: some input structures are accepted, some are rejected, and some may be neither accepted nor rejected by a given machine. The customary two-valuedness of logic could be restored by giving our machines the ability to tell when their (polynomial) time limit is reached, so they could reject any input not accepted by then. In Section 10, we take a step in this direction

by giving our computation model explicit knowledge of the cardinality of (the base set of) the input structure. Then Parity is in this extension of ČPTime, but "parity of subsets" is not, and neither is perfect matchability. It is not clear whether the machines of this extended model can detect when a polynomial time bound expires; the difficulty is in accurately counting the steps performed by parallel subcomputations.

The logic ČPTime can be extended further with a counting function (see Section 4) and maybe it should be. This would be a natural way to continue this investigation. This extension allows the machines to detect when a polynomial time bound is reached, so the logic becomes two-valued. It seems likely that perfect matchability remains uncomputable even in this extended ČPTime computation model.

In connection with extensions like this, let us notice that, unless there is a logic that captures PTime, there is no end to possible extensions of ČPTime. Any PTime decidable problem can be converted to a quantifier and added to ČPTime.

Certain aspects of the work reported here are related to previous work of others. We comment briefly here on these relationships, and we thank the referees for bringing some of this work to our attention.

Our computation model works not only with the given input structure but with the universe of hereditarily finite sets over that structure. The idea that the hereditarily finite sets (over a set of atoms) form a natural domain for computation is quite classical and is developed in detail in Barwise's book [4]. Connections with resource-bounded notions of computation are presented in [20] in terms of weak set theories. Codings of the hereditarily finite sets by natural numbers play a central role in his presentation, even in the definition of such concepts as PTime. Similarly, Dahlhaus and Makowsky [7] work in a context very similar to the universe of hereditarily finite sets over a database and make heavy use of numerical coding. They are, however, interested primarily in general computability, without resource bounds. Like Barwise but unlike Sazonov, Dahlhaus, and Makowsky, we consider computations directly in the world of hereditarily finite sets without numerical coding. Indeed, numerical coding is not available to us, because we are interested in input structures that need not be equipped with an ordering.

In the context of computation by Boolean circuits, Otto [19] has considered computations invariant under automorphisms of the input structure, and he has obtained, under suitable hypotheses, results which, like those of our Section 8, assert the existence of small supports for certain objects. In his case, however, those objects are relations on the input structure, whereas our results deal with general hereditarily finite sets over the input structure. The extra generality in our situation increases considerably the amount of combinatorial work needed to establish these results. Also, Otto needs to assume that the orbits (under the automorphism group) under consideration are of polynomial size; in our approach, this is not a separate assumption but a consequence of the polynomial time bound on the computation.

The previous work most closely related to ours, both in purpose and in content though not in appearance, is that of Abiteboul and Vianu, partly in collaboration with Papadimitriou and Vardi [1–3]. They introduced three sorts of machines, currently known as the relational machine, the generic machine, and the reflective relational

machine. Their conventions for imposing time bounds on computations differ from ours in two ways. The less important difference is that they allow updating a whole relation in a single step. Another way to express this difference is to say that they count parallel time (with a number of processors polynomial in the size of the database) while we count sequential time; even in parallel computations, we add the times taken by all the processors. Thus, by our standards they underestimate time; by their standards we overestimate. Fortunately, the discrepancy is only a polynomial factor, since the parallelism allowed by their model is only polynomial.

A second difference, however, is more serious. In the generic and relational machine models, Abiteboul and Vianu require the number of steps in a PTime computation to be polynomial with respect to the size not of the actual input structure but of a certain quotient, obtained by identifying sufficiently indistinguishable (tuples of) objects. For ordered structures, no identification takes place, but in general, the quotient may be far smaller than the original structure. As a result, their time bounds are more stringent than ours and their models therefore appear less powerful.

We shall show in Section 7 that our model is strictly more powerful than the relational machine model. The structures we use for this purpose are essentially the same size as the quotient mentioned in the preceding paragraph, so the relational machine is, in these examples, not unfairly hampered by the use of the quotient in defining its input size.

As mentioned above, it appears that the generic machine model is equivalent to ours, except for the differences, described above, in how the models measure time. Specifically, the computations of generic machines can be straightforwardly simulated in our model, while the simulation in the reverse direction, it seems, can be carried out using the "form and matter" constructions in Section 9 of the present paper. Nevertheless, we feel that, for the reasons indicated above, the syntax of ČPTime is closer to intuition and therefore easier to use.

The third author proved that the ČPTime logic enjoys the zero–one law [21]. It makes sense also to investigate ČPTime as a complexity class. It is not difficult to concoct an artificial complete problem for ČPTime, but it would be interesting to see a natural one. A recent relevant contribution to the study of computation on unordered structures is Ref. [22].

2. Preliminaries

We recall various definitions and establish some terminology and notation. In this paper, vocabularies are finite.

2.1. Global relations

We start with a convenient notion of global relation [12].

A k-ary *global relation* of vocabulary Υ is a function ρ such that

- the domain $\mathrm{Dom}(\rho)$ consists of Υ-structures and is closed under isomorphism,

- with every structure $A \in \mathrm{Dom}(\rho)$, ρ associates a k-ary relation ρ_A on (the base set of) A, and
- ρ is *abstract* in the following sense: every isomorphism from a structure $A \in \mathrm{Dom}(\rho)$ onto a structure B is also an isomorphism from the structure (A, ρ_A) onto the structure (B, ρ_B).

Typically the domain of a global relation of vocabulary Υ is the class of all Υ-structures or the class of all finite Υ-structures. For example, every first-order formula $\varphi(v_1, \ldots, v_k)$ of vocabulary Υ, with free variables as shown, denotes a k-ary global relation $\rho(v_1, \ldots, v_k)$ on all Υ-structures. To avoid set-theoretic difficulties, however, we generally deal only with global relations on structures of bounded cardinality, in fact usually just on finite structures.

2.2. Least fixed point logic FO+LFP

Least fixed point logic has been around for a long time [18]. It is especially popular in finite model theory [9]. The latter book contains all the facts that we need. For the reader's convenience and to establish notation, we recall a few things.

Syntax. FO+LFP is obtained from first-order logic by means of the following additional formula-formation rule:

- Suppose that $\varphi(P, \bar{v})$ is a formula with a k-ary predicate variable P and a k-tuple $\bar{v}$ of free individual variables. Further suppose that P occurs only positively in φ. If $\bar{t}$ is a k-tuple of terms, then

$$[\mathrm{LFP}_{P, \bar{v}}(\varphi(P, \bar{v}))](\bar{t})$$

is a formula.

The vocabulary and the free variables of the new formula ψ are defined in the obvious way. In particular, P is not in the vocabulary of ψ. We say that a predicate Q in the vocabulary of ψ occurs only positively in ψ if and only if it occurs only positively in φ.

Semantics. The formula $\varphi(P, \bar{v})$, may have free individual variables $\bar{u}$ in addition to $\bar{v}$. Let $\bar{w}$ be a k-tuple of fresh individual variables, and let Υ be the vocabulary of the formula

$$\psi(\bar{u}, \bar{w}) = [\mathrm{LFP}_{P, \bar{v}}(\varphi(P, \bar{u}, \bar{v}))](\bar{w})$$

The meaning of ψ is a global relation $\rho(\bar{u}, \bar{w})$ whose domain consists of all Υ-structures (unless we restrict the domain explicitly, for example, to finite Υ-structures).

Given an Υ-structure A with fixed values $\bar{a}$ of parameters $\bar{u}$, consider the following operator on k-ary relations over BaseSet(A):

$$\theta(P) = \{\bar{v} : \varphi(P, \bar{a}, \bar{v})\}.$$

Since φ is positive in P, θ is monotone in P. The k-ary relation $\rho_A(\bar{a}, \bar{w})$ is the least fixed point of θ. To obtain the least fixed point, generate the sequence

$$\emptyset \subseteq \theta(\emptyset) \subseteq \theta^2(\emptyset) \subseteq \cdots$$

of k-ary relations over A. For a finite structure A, there exists a natural number l such that $\theta^l(\emptyset) = \theta^{l+1}(\emptyset)$; in this case the least fixed point is $\theta^l(\emptyset)$. The case of infinite A is similar except that the sequence may continue transfinitely, with unions at limit stages, and in particular the closure ordinal l may be infinite.

Simultaneous induction. Let Υ be a vocabulary and consider FO+LFP formulas $\varphi(P, Q, \bar{u})$ and $\psi(P, Q, \bar{v})$ of vocabulary $\Upsilon \cup \{P, Q\}$ which are positive in P and Q. Here $\mathrm{Arity}(P) = \mathrm{Length}(\bar{u})$ and $\mathrm{Arity}(Q) = \mathrm{Length}(\bar{v})$. There may be additional free individual variables which we consider as parameters.

Given an Υ-structure A with fixed parameters, consider the monotone operator on pairs of relations

$$\theta(P, Q) = (\{\bar{u} : \varphi(P, Q, \bar{u})\}, \{\bar{v} : \psi(P, Q, \bar{v})\})$$

and let (P^*, Q^*) be the least fixed point of θ.

Proposition 1. *The global relations P^* and Q^* are expressible by* FO+LFP *formulas. Moreover, the result generalizes to simultaneous induction over any finite number of predicate variables.*

2.3. Finite variable infinitary logic $L_{\infty,\omega}^{\omega}$

Again, the book [9] contains all the information that we need, but we recall a few things for the reader's convenience.

Syntax. As in a popular version of first-order logic, $L_{\infty,\omega}^{\omega}$ formulas are built from atomic formulas by means of negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, the existential quantifier and the universal quantifier. The only difference is that $L_{\infty,\omega}^{\omega}$ allows one to form the conjunction and the disjunction of an arbitrary set S of formulas provided that the total number of variables in all S-formulas is finite. Recall also our standing convention that all vocabularies are finite. For every natural number m, $L_{\infty,\omega}^{m}$ is the fragment of $L_{\infty,\omega}^{\omega}$ where formulas use at most m individual variables.

Semantics. Every $L_{\infty,\omega}^{\omega}$ formula of vocabulary Υ with k free individual variables denotes a k-ary global relation of vocabulary Υ in the obvious way.

An important fact is that every global relation on structures of bounded cardinality expressible in FO+LFP is expressible in $L_{\infty,\omega}^{\omega}$. This is explained in [9, Theorem 7.4.2] for global relations on finite structures. For infinite structures, the stages of the iteration leading to the fixed point can be defined in $L_{\infty,\omega}^{\omega}$ by an induction like that for

finite structures but with an additional clause using infinite disjunctions to represent the unions that occur at limit stages. For structures of cardinality bounded by κ, the iterations involved in the semantics of LFP stabilize before stage κ^+ (the next cardinal after κ, regarded as an initial ordinal), so the final result of the iteration can be expressed in $L^\omega_{\infty,\omega}$ as stage κ^+.

Pebble games. There is a pebble game $G_m(A,B)$ appropriate to $L^m_{\infty,\omega}$. Here A and B are structures of the same purely relational vocabulary. For explanatory purposes, we pretend that A is located on the left and B is located on the right, but in fact A and B may be the same structure.

The game is played by Spoiler and Duplicator. For each $i = 1,\ldots,k$, there are two pebbles marked by i: the left i-pebble and the right i-pebble. Initially all the pebbles are off the board. After any number of rounds, for every i, either both i-pebbles are off the board or else the left i-pebble covers an element of A and the right i-pebble covers an element of B. In the obvious way, the pebbles on the board define a relation R between A to B. A round of $G^k(A,B)$ is played as follows.

If R is not a partial isomorphism, then the game is over; Spoiler has won and Duplicator has lost. Otherwise Spoiler chooses a number i; if the i-pebbles are on the board, they are taken off the board. Then Spoiler chooses *left* or *right* and puts that i-pebble on an element of the corresponding structure. Duplicator puts the other i-pebble on an element of the other structure.

Duplicator wins a play of the game if the number of rounds in the play is infinite.

Proposition 2. *If Duplicator has a winning strategy in $G_m(A,B)$, then no $L^m_{\infty,\omega}$ sentence distinguishes between A and B. Therefore, for every* FO+LFP *sentence φ, there exists m such that, for any A and B, if Duplicator has a winning strategy in $G_m(A,B)$ then φ does not distinguish A from B.*

2.4. Set theory

Let A be a structure. In the literature, the notation $|A|$ is used in two ways: to denote the base set of A and to denote the cardinality of BaseSet(A). We will employ notation $|A|$ only in the sense of cardinality; we will also use an alternative notation Card(A) for the cardinality of A.

As usual in set theory, we identify a natural number (that is a non-negative integer) i with the set of smaller natural numbers $\{j: j < i\}$; this set is called the von Neumann ordinal for i. The first infinite ordinal is denoted ω.

We consider sets built from atoms (also called urelements). The term *object* will mean an atom or a set. A set X is *transitive* if $y \in x \in X$ implies $y \in X$. If X is an object, then TC(X) is the least transitive set Y with $X \in Y$. An object X is *hereditarily finite* if TC(X) is finite.

P is the powerset operation; if X is a set then $\mathbf{P}(X)$ is the collection of all subsets of X. If X is a finite set of atoms, then

$$\mathrm{HF}(X) := \bigcup \{\mathbf{P}^i(X): i < \omega\} = X \cup \mathbf{P}(X) \cup \mathbf{P}(X \cup \mathbf{P}(X)) \cup \cdots$$

where $\mathbf{P}^0(X) = X$ and $\mathbf{P}^{i+1}(X) = \mathbf{P}(\bigcup_{j \leqslant i} \mathbf{P}^j(X))$. Alternatively, $\mathrm{HF}(X)$ can be defined as the smallest set Y such that $X \subseteq Y$ and every finite subset of Y is a member of Y. The members of $\mathrm{HF}(X)$ are exactly the members of X and those hereditarily finite sets y such that all atoms in $\mathrm{TC}(y)$ belong to X.

Every set has an ordinal rank. If x is an atom or the empty set, then the rank of x equals 0. Otherwise, the rank of x is the smallest ordinal strictly above the ranks of all members of x.

3. PTime and PTime logics

In this section, structures are finite and global relations are restricted to finite structures.

By definition, the complexity class PTime consists of languages, that is sets of (without loss of generality, binary) strings. A language X is PTime if there exists a PTime Turing machine (that is polynomial time bounded Turing machine) that accepts exactly the strings in X. This definition is easily generalized to ordered structures by means of a standard encoding; see for example [9]. We will say that a Turing machine accepts an ordered structure A if it accepts the standard encoding of A.

The generalization to arbitrary (that is not necessarily ordered) structures is less obvious. One does not want to distinguish between isomorphic structures and there is no known, easily computable string encoding of isomorphism classes of structures.

The problem was first addressed by Chandra and Harel in the context of database theory [6]. We describe their approach. A *database* is defined as a purely relational structure whose elements come from some fixed countable set, without loss of generality the set of natural numbers. Thus, each database inherits an ordering from this countable set, and so standard encodings make sense, but isomorphisms are not required to respect the orderings. A *query* is a global relation over databases; recall that global relations respect isomorphisms. A query Q is PTime if the set

$$\{(B, \bar{x}): \bar{x} \in Q(B)\}$$

is PTime. Thus each PTime query Q is given by a PTime Turing machine M that accepts a string s if and only if s is the standard encoding of some $(B, \bar{x})$ with $\bar{x} \in Q(B)$; call M a *PTime witness* for Q. Let W be the collection of all PTime witnesses for all queries. It is easy to check that W is not recursive. Chandra and Harel posed the following question. Does there exists a recursive set $S \subset W$ such that every PTime query has a PTime witness in S?

Gurevich translated their question as a question of the existence of a logic that captures PTime [12]. He conjectured that the answer is negative; in this connection

his definition of a logic is very broad. If desired, some obvious requirements can be imposed; see [8] in this connection. Here we recall Gurevich's definitions and slightly generalize them in order to define three-valued logics.

PTime global relations. What does it mean that a global relation is PTime? The question easily reduces to the case of nullary global relations. Indeed, let ρ be a k-ary global relation of some vocabulary Υ and let $c_1,\ldots,c_k$ be the first k individual constants outside of Υ. Define the nullary relation σ of vocabulary $\Upsilon^+ = \Upsilon \cup \{c_1,\ldots,c_k\}$ as follows. If A is an Υ-structure, and $a_1,\ldots,a_k$ are elements of A, and B is the Υ^+-expansion of A where $a_1,\ldots,a_k$ interpret $c_1,\ldots,c_k$, then $\sigma_B \Leftrightarrow \rho_A(a_1,\ldots,a_k)$. Declare ρ PTime if σ is so.

A nullary global relation ρ of vocabulary Υ can be identified with the class of Υ-structures A such that ρ_A is true. It remains to define what it means that a class K of structures of some vocabulary Υ is PTime. Let $<$ be a binary predicate not in Υ. An *ordered version* of an Υ-structure A is a structure B of vocabulary $\Upsilon \cup \{<\}$ such that the Υ-reduct of B is isomorphic to A and the interpretation of $<$ is a linear order.

Define a class of K of Υ-structures to be PTime if it is closed under isomorphisms and there exists a PTime Turing machine M (a PTime witness for K) which accepts a binary string s if and only if s is the standard encoding of an ordered version of some structure in K. This definition agrees with that of Chandra–Harel described above, if we restrict it to the structures they consider – all base sets contained in a fixed countable set.

Logics. For simplicity, we define logics whose formulas denote nullary global relations. The trick above allows one to extend such a logic so that its formulas denote arbitrary global relations.

A *logic L* is given by a pair of functions (Sen,Sat) satisfying the following conditions. Sen associates with every vocabulary Υ a recursive set Sen(Υ) whose elements are called *L-sentences of vocabulary* Υ. Sat associates with every vocabulary Υ a recursive relation $\mathrm{Sat}_\Upsilon(A, \varphi)$ where A is an Υ-structure and φ an L-sentence of vocabulary Υ. We say that A satisfies φ (symbolically $A \models \varphi$) if $\mathrm{Sat}_\Upsilon(A, \varphi)$ holds. It is assumed that $\mathrm{Sat}_\Upsilon(A, \varphi) \Leftrightarrow \mathrm{Sat}_\Upsilon(B, \varphi)$ if A and B are isomorphic.

If φ is a sentence of vocabulary Υ, let $\mathrm{Mod}(\varphi)$ be the collection of Υ-structures A satisfying φ.

PTime logics. Let L be a logic. For each Υ and each $\varphi \in \mathrm{Sen}(\Upsilon)$, let $K(\Upsilon, \varphi)$ be the class of Υ-structures A such that $A \models \varphi$. Call L PTime, if every class $K(\Upsilon, \varphi)$ is PTime.

Logic that Capture Ptime. A logic L *captures PTime* if it is PTime and, for every vocabulary Υ, every PTime class of Υ-structures coincides with some $K(\Upsilon, \varphi)$.

Remark. It may seem odd that the definition of logic does not require any uniformity with respect to varying Υ, but uniformity is not necessary. It is not hard to show

that, if there is a logic of graphs (rather than arbitrary structures) that captures PTime on graphs, then there is a logic that captures PTime on arbitrary structures and that possesses some uniformity with respect to Υ [12].

Three-valued logics. In the cases when a logic is really a computation model and sentences are computing machines, A satisfies φ means that φ accepts A. That calls for the following natural generalization. Call logics defined above *two-valued*.

A *three-valued logic* L is like a two-valued logic except that $\mathrm{Sat}_\Upsilon(A, \varphi)$ has three possible values telling us whether φ accepts A, or φ rejects A, or neither. It is assumed that $\mathrm{Sat}_\Upsilon(A, \varphi) = \mathrm{Sat}_\Upsilon(B, \varphi)$ if A and B are isomorphic.

Each L-sentence φ of vocabulary Υ gives rise to two disjoint classes of Υ-structures. The class $\mathrm{Mod}^+(\varphi)$ of Υ-structures accepted by φ and the class $\mathrm{Mod}^-(\varphi)$ of classes rejected by φ. Call L PTime if, for every φ, the classes $\mathrm{Mod}^+(\varphi)$ and $\mathrm{Mod}^-(\varphi)$ are PTime.

Two disjoint classes K_1, K_2 of structures of some vocabulary Υ are *L-separable* if there exists an L-sentence φ such that $K_1 \subseteq \mathrm{Mod}^+(\varphi)$ and $K_2 \subseteq \mathrm{Mod}^-(\varphi)$. We will see that this is a more robust notion than the similar notion where $\subseteq$ is replaced with equality.

Abiteboul–Vianu relational machines. Finally, for future reference, we recall (a version of) Abiteboul–Vianu's relational machines [2, 3].

A relational machine is a Turing machine augmented with a *relational store* which is a structure of a fixed purely relational vocabulary Υ. A part Υ_0 of the vocabulary is devoted to input relations. The Turing tape is initially empty. As usual, the program consists of "if condition then action" instructions. Here is an example of an instruction.

If the control state is s_3, and the head reads symbol 1, and the relation R_1 is empty, then change the state to s_4, replace 1 by 0, move the head to the right and replace R_2 with $R_2 \cap R_3$.

In general, instructions are Turing instructions except that (1) the condition may be augmented with the emptiness test of one of the relations, and (2) the action may be augmented with an algebraic operation on the relations. The algebraic operations are of the following four types. It is assumed that the arities of the operations involved are appropriate; in the example above, the relations R_2 and R_3 are of the same arity.
- Boolean operations.
- Projections $\pi_{i_1 \ldots i_m} R_k$. Project R_k on the coordinates $i_1, \ldots, i_m$ in the specified order.
- Cartesian product of two relations.
- Selections $\sigma_{i=j} R_k$. Select the tuples in R_k whose ith component coincides with the jth component.

A PTime relational machine M can be defined as a relational machine together with a polynomial $p(n)$ bounding the number of computation steps on input structures of size n. The notion of PTime relational machine gives rise to a PTime logic (which

may be called AV Logic) where the sentences of vocabulary Υ_0 are PTime relational machines with input vocabulary Υ_0.

In our view, AV Logic is naturally three-valued. Given an input structure I of size n, a PTime relational machine $(M, p(n))$ may accept I within time $p(n)$, may reject I within time $p(n)$, or do neither. In many computation models, e.g., the Turing machine model, one customarily regards all non-accepted inputs as rejected. This convention is reasonable for models where the machine can determine the size n of its input, compute $p(n)$, keep track of the number of steps it has executed, and reject an input if the time limit expires without acceptance. But for a computation model (or logic) that cannot determine the size of its input or cannot keep track of the number of steps it executes, to call the undecided inputs rejected is to go beyond what the computing devices could do on their own. In this sense, our three-valued approach is more appropriate whenever the size of the input is unavailable to the computing devices.

The three-valuedness of the computation model affects the notion of simulation. For one program Π' to simulate another program Π, we require that Π' accept every input accepted by Π and reject every input rejected by Π, but we do not care what Π' does with inputs for which Π reaches no decision. Thus, any pair of classes separated by Π will also be separated by Π', but not necessarily vice versa.

4. The computation model

Our computing devices are abstract state machines (ASMs, formerly called evolving algebras) [13, 14] adapted for our purposes here.

4.1. Vocabularies

An ASM vocabulary is a finite collection of function names, each of a fixed arity. Some function names may be marked as *relational* or *static*, or both. Relational names are also called *predicates*. A function name is *dynamic* if it is not marked static. The Greek letter Υ is reserved to denote vocabularies.

In our case, every vocabulary consists of the following four parts:

Logic names. The equality sign, nullary function names `true`, `false` and the names of the usual Boolean operations. All logic names are relational and static. (The standard ASM definition [13] requires another logic name, `undef`, but we will not employ `undef` here, using $\emptyset$ instead as a default value.)

Set-theoretic names. The static binary predicate $\in$ and the following static non-predicate function names.
- Nullary names $\emptyset$ and Atoms.
- Unary names $\bigcup$ and TheUnique.
- A binary name Pair.

Input names. A finite collection of static names. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that all input names are relational.

Dynamic names. A finite collection of dynamic function names including nullary predicates Halt and Output.

4.2. States

A *state A* of vocabulary Υ is a structure A of vocabulary Υ satisfying a number of conditions described in this subsection.

Base set. The base set of A consists of two disjoint parts:
1. A finite set X of atoms, that is elements that are not sets.
2. The collection of all hereditarily finite sets built from the atoms.

The atoms and the sets are *objects* of A. The objects form a transitive set $\mathrm{HF}(X)$ which can be defined as the closure of X under the following operation: If n is a natural number and $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ are in, then throw $\{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}$ in. We have also as in Section 2.4

$$\mathrm{HF}(X) = \bigcup_{n < \omega} \mathbf{P}^n(X).$$

Set-theoretic functions. The interpretations of $\in$ and $\emptyset$ are obvious. Atoms is the set of atoms. If a is an atom, then $\bigcup a = \emptyset$. If $a_1, \ldots, a_j$ are atoms and $b_1, \ldots, b_k$ are sets then $\bigcup \{a_1, \ldots, a_j, b_1, \ldots, b_k\} = b_1 \cup \cdots \cup b_k$. If a is a singleton set, then TheUnique(a) is the unique element of a; otherwise TheUnique$(a) = \emptyset$. (If x is a set then $x = $ TheUnique$\{x\} = \bigcup\{x\}$, so TheUnique is redundant in this situation, but it is needed if x is an atom.) Pair$(a, b) = \{a, b\}$.

Logic names. `false` and `true` are interpreted as 0 and 1 respectively. Recall that 0 is $\emptyset$ and that 1 is Pair$(0, 0) = \{\emptyset\}$. The Boolean connectives are interpreted in the obvious way over the Boolean values $0, 1$ and take the value 0 if at least one of the arguments is not Boolean.

Predicates. Predicates are interpreted as functions whose only possible values are the Boolean values $0, 1$. If $P(\bar{a})$ evaluates to 1 (respectively 0), we say that $P(\bar{a})$ *holds* or *is true* (respectively, *fails* or *is false*). The input predicates "live" over the atoms: if P is an input predicate and $P(a_1, \ldots, a_j)$ holds, then every a_i is an atom.

Dynamic functions. Define the *extent* of a dynamic function f of arity j to be the set

$$\{(x_0, \ldots, x_j): f(x_0, \ldots, x_{j-1}) = x_j \neq 0\}.$$

The only restriction on the interpretation of a dynamic function f is that its extent is finite.

4.3. Input structures

Consider an ASM vocabulary Υ. An input structure appropriate for Υ-programs is any finite structure I of the input vocabulary (i.e., the vocabulary consisting of the input names from Υ). We want to treat the elements of I as atoms and build sets over them, so a little problem arises if some elements of I happen to be sets. The actual input corresponding to I is a structure isomorphic to I whose base set (the universe) consists of atoms. An Υ-state is *initial* if the extent of every dynamic function is empty. For any input structure I appropriate for Υ, there is a unique, up to isomorphism, initial Υ-state A where the atoms together with input relations form a structure isomorphic to I. We call this A the initial state *generated* by I.

Remark. We will not be very careful in distinguishing between an input structure I and its atomic version. Without loss of generality, one may assume that the input structure itself consists of atoms.

4.4. Terms

By induction, we define a syntactic category of terms and a subcategory of Boolean terms.
- A variable is a term.
- If f is a function name of arity j and $t_1, \ldots, t_j$ are terms, then $f(t_1, \ldots, t_j)$ is a term. If f is a predicate then $f(t_1, \ldots, t_j)$ is Boolean.
- Suppose that v is a variable, $t(v)$ is a term, r is a term without free occurrences of v, and $g(v)$ is a Boolean term. Then

$$\{t(v) : v \in r : g(v)\}$$

is a term.

In the usual way, the same induction is used to define free variables of a given term. In particular, the free variables of $\{t(v) : v \in r : g(v)\}$ are those of $t(v), r$ and $g(v)$ except for v.

Semantics is obvious. In particular, the value of $\{t(v) : v \in r : g(v)\}$ at a given state A is the set of values $\mathrm{Val}_A(t(v))$ such that, in A, both $v \in r$ and $g(v)$ hold.

4.5. Syntax of rules

Transition rules are defined inductively.

Skip. Skip is a rule.

Update rules. Suppose that f is a dynamic function name of some arity r and $t_0, \ldots, t_r$ are terms. If f is relational, we require that t_0 is Boolean. Then

$$f(t_1, \ldots, t_r) := t_0$$

is a rule.

Conditional rules. If g is a Boolean term and R_1, R_2 are rules, then

```
if g then R₁ else R₂ endif
```

is a rule.

Do-forall rules. If v is a variable, r is a term without v free, and $R_0(v)$ is a rule, then

```
do forall v ∈ r
  R₀(v)
enddo
```

is a rule with *head variable* v, *guard* r and *body* R_0. The definition of free and bound variables is obvious.

Abbreviate rule

```
do forall v ∈ {0, 1}
  if v = 0 then R₀                    do in-parallel
  else R₁ endif          to              R₀, R₁
enddo                                  enddo
```

Here and in the following, we use standard notation as a more readable substitute for the official syntax. In particular, 0 means $\emptyset$, $\{x, y\}$ means $\mathrm{Pair}(x, y)$, $\{x\}$ means $\mathrm{Pair}(x, x)$, $x \cup y$ means $\bigcup \{x, y\}$ and 1 means $\{0\}$.

Readers familiar with other work on abstract state machines, such as [13, 14], will notice that our model lacks the customary `import` rule. The effect of this rule can, however, be simulated (with some bookkeeping effort) because our states are infinite structures. Thanks to the pairing function, we can use sets of sufficiently high rank to play the role of imported elements.

4.6. Semantics of rules

If ζ is a variable assignment over a state A, assigning values to finitely many variables, then the pair $B = (A, \zeta)$ is an *expanded state*, $A = \mathrm{State}(B)$, $\zeta = \mathrm{Assign}(B)$, and $\mathrm{Dom}(\zeta) = \mathrm{Var}(B)$. Further, let v be a variable and a an element of A. Then $B(v \mapsto a)$ is the expanded state obtained from B by assigning or reassigning a to v. In other words, $B(v \mapsto a) = (A, \zeta')$ where $\mathrm{Dom}(\zeta') = \mathrm{Dom}(\zeta) \cup \{v\}$, $\zeta'(v) = a$ and $\zeta'(u) = \zeta(u)$ for the remaining variables.

A *location* of an expanded state A is a pair $\ell = (f, \bar{a})$ where f is a dynamic function and $\bar{a}$ is a tuple of elements of A such that the length of $\bar{a}$ equals the arity of f. If b is also an element of A, then the pair $\alpha = (\ell, b)$ is an *update* of A. $((f, (a_1, \ldots, a_j)), b)$ is abbreviated to $(f, a_1, \ldots, a_j, b)$. To *fire* α at A, put b into the location ℓ, that is, redefine A so that $f(\bar{a}) = b$. The other locations remain intact. The resulting state is the *sequel* of A with respect to α. Two updates *clash* if they have the same locations but different new contents.

An *action* over a state A is a set of updates of A. An action is *consistent* if it contains no clashing updates. To perform an action β, do the following. If β is consistent, then fire all updates $\alpha \in \beta$ simultaneously; otherwise do nothing. The result is the *sequel* of A with respect to β. If β is inconsistent then the sequel of A is A itself.

A rule R and the expanded state A are *appropriate* for each other if $\mathrm{Voc}(A)$ contains all function symbols in R and $\mathrm{Var}(A)$ contains all free variables in R.

Now we are ready to explain the semantics of rules. The denotation $\mathrm{Den}(R)$ of a rule R is a function on expanded states A appropriate for R. Each $\mathrm{Den}(R)(A)$ (or $\mathrm{Den}(R,A)$ for brevity) is an action. To fire R at A, perform the action $\mathrm{Den}(R,A)$ at $\mathrm{State}(A)$. The *sequel* of A with respect to R is the sequel of A with respect to $\mathrm{Den}(R,A)$. $\mathrm{Den}(R,A)$ is defined by induction on R.

Skip. $\mathrm{Den}(\mathrm{Skip},A) = \emptyset$.

Update rules. If R is an update rule $f(\bar{s}) := t$ and ℓ is location $(f, \mathrm{Val}_A(\bar{s}))$, then $\mathrm{Den}(R,A) = \{(\ell, \mathrm{Val}_A(t))\}$.

Conditional rules. If R is the rule if g then R_1 else R_2 endif, then

$$\mathrm{Den}(R,A) = \begin{cases} \mathrm{Den}(R_1,A) \text{ if } g \text{ holds at } A; \\ \mathrm{Den}(R_2,A) \text{ otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Do-forall rules. If R is

```
do forall v ∈ r,
  R₀(v)
enddo
```

then

$$\mathrm{Den}(R,A) = \bigcup \{\mathrm{Den}(R_0(v), A(v \mapsto a)) \colon a \in \mathrm{Val}_A(r)\}$$

4.7. Programs

A program is a rule without free variables. The vocabulary $\mathrm{Voc}(\Pi)$ of a program Π is the collection of function names that occur in Π. States of Π are states of the vocabulary $\mathrm{Voc}(\Pi)$.

Runs. A *run* of Π is a (finite or infinite) sequence $\langle A_i \colon i < \kappa \rangle$ of states of Π such that
- A_0 is an initial state,
- every A_{i+1} is a sequel of A_i with respect to Π, and
- Halt fails at every A_i with $i + 1 < \kappa$.

Here κ is a positive integer or the first infinite ordinal ω. The *length of a finite run* $\langle A_i \colon i \leqslant l \rangle$ is l. The *length of an infinite run* is ω.

Let I be an input structure for Π. *The run of Π on I* is the run $\langle A_i \colon i < \kappa \rangle$ such that

- A_0 is the initial state generated by I, and
- either κ is infinite, or else κ is finite and Halt holds at the final state $A_{\kappa-1}$.

The *base set* and *objects* of a run $\langle A_i : i < \kappa \rangle$ are those of A_0.

4.8. The counting function

There are many ways to extend the computation model described above without introducing explicit choice in its full generality. One natural extension is achieved by introducing the counting function which, given a set x of cardinality k, produces the von Neumann ordinal for k.

Remark. Since the computation model is expandable by adding static functions for counting or perfect matching, etc., one gets in fact a notion of relative computability.

5. Choiceless PTime

It is easy to check that every computable global relation on finite structures is computable by an appropriate ASM program. The idea is that an ASM computation can first produce the set of all linear orderings of the input structure. (For more details about this, see Section 7.) Then it can simulate a Turing machine computation on ordered structures by means of parallel subcomputations, one for each ordering.

Thus, the "choicelessness" of our machines has a real effect only in the presence of a resource bound stringent enough to prevent the computation from trying all possible choices. We are interested in polynomial-time computation, and this, when reasonably defined, is stringent enough.

5.1. The definition of choiceless PTime

Critical and active objects. Let A be a state and $x \in \mathrm{BaseSet}(A)$.
- Object x is *critical* at A if x is an atom, or $x \in \{0, 1\}$, or x is a value of a dynamic function, or x is a component of a tuple where some dynamic function takes a value different from $\emptyset$.
- Object x is *active* at A if $x \in \mathrm{TC}(y)$ for some critical y.

Further, let ρ be a run of a program Π. An object x is *active in* ρ if it is so at some state of ρ. The idea behind this definition is that the active objects are those that are really involved in the computation process.

PTime programs. There are two ways to count the steps in a run of an ASM program. One is as the length of the run, considered as a sequence of states. That is, one execution of the entire program counts as a single step, regardless of how much work this involves. We use the word "macrosteps" for steps counted in this way; "macro" is intended to suggest that there may be a lot going on inside one such step. The other

approach is to count every function evaluation and every transfer of control (as in a conditional rule) as a separate step. We use the word "microstep" for steps in this sense. When several subcomputations are done in parallel, the numbers of microsteps in them are to be added to produce the microstep count for the whole computation. Microsteps are intended to provide an honest measure of the total amount of work done by a computation. Indeed, we sometimes refer to the number of microsteps as "honest computation time". This measure agrees, except for some overhead, with the time required by a sequential simulation of the computation on a standard device such as a Turing machine. For details about the definition of microsteps, see [5]. We shall not need the details here, because the requirement that a computation have only polynomially many microsteps can be reformulated as in the definition below, bounding macrosteps and active objects.

A *PTime* (*bounded*) *program* $\bar{\Pi}$ is a triple $\bar{\Pi} = (\Pi, p(n), q(n))$ where Π is a program and $p(n), q(n)$ are integer polynomials. The *run* of $\bar{\Pi}$ on an input structure I of size n is the longest initial segment ρ of the run of Π on I such that the length of $\rho \leqslant p(n)$ and the number of active objects in $\rho \leqslant q(n)$. A PTime program $\bar{\Pi}$ *accepts* (respectively *rejects*) an input structure I if the run of $\bar{\Pi}$ on I halts (i.e., ends with value true for Halt) and Output equals `true` (respectively `false`) in the final state.

Remark. In this definition, $p(n)$ bounds the number of macrosteps in the run ρ, while $q(n)$ limits the amount of parallelism so that one macrostep contains only polynomially many microsteps.

To see what can go wrong if the $q(n)$ restriction is omitted, consider the program

$$c := c \cup \{\emptyset\} \cup \bigcup \{\{u \cup \{v\} : v \in \texttt{Atoms} : \texttt{true}\} : u \in c : \texttt{true}\}.$$

According to our definitions, c is initially empty. If the number of atoms is n, then this program produces, after a run of length n, a state where $c = \mathbf{P}(\text{Atoms})$. Each of the 2^n sets of atoms will have been "visited" by the computation. In other words, in only n macrosteps the computation executed exponentially many microsteps.

The role of $q(n)$ in our definition is to prevent such things from counting as PTime.

Choiceless polynomial time. Notice that the classes of accepted and rejected input structures are disjoint but not necessarily complementary and that increasing the polynomial bound may increase these classes. If the size of the input structure is known and if a program can keep track of the honest computation time, then the program can insure that every computation accepts or rejects the input. Otherwise our three-valued picture (accept, reject, neither) seems more appropriate.

Here, we define a complexity class Choiceless Polynomial Time (in brief ČPTime) as a collection of pairs (K_1, K_2) where K_1, K_2 are disjoint classes of finite structures of the same vocabulary. A pair (K_1, K_2) is in ČPTime (or ČPTime separable) if there exists a PTime program that accepts all structures in K_1 and rejects all structures in K_2. The program may accept some structures not in K_1 or reject some structures not in

K_2. Obviously, there is a three-valued logic that separates exactly $\tilde{C}$PTime pairs; use PTime programs as sentences.

A class K of finite structures of the same vocabulary Υ is in $\tilde{C}$PTime, if the pair (K, K') is in $\tilde{C}$PTime where K' is the complement of K in the class of finite structures of vocabulary Υ.

Call two programs Π and Σ *PTime equivalent* if
- for every PTime version $\bar{\Pi}$ of Π, there exists a PTime version $\bar{\Sigma}$ of Σ which accepts all input structures accepted by $\bar{\Pi}$ and rejects all input structures rejected by $\bar{\Pi}$, and
- for every PTime version $\bar{\Sigma}$ of Σ, there exists a PTime version $\bar{\Pi}$ of Π which accepts all input structures accepted by $\bar{\Sigma}$ and rejects all input structures rejected by $\bar{\Sigma}$.

5.2. Upper bounds for $\tilde{C}$PTime

In our definition of a PTime program, the polynomial q bounds the space used by the computation. So one may fear that the definition is too broad, akin to PSpace rather than PTime. We show in this subsection that $\tilde{C}$PTime is not too broad.

Theorem 3. *Consider a PTime program* $\bar{\Pi} = (\Pi, p(n), q(n))$.
1. *There is a PTime-bounded Turing machine that accepts exactly those strings that encode ordered versions of input structures accepted by $\bar{\Pi}$ and rejects exactly those strings that encode ordered versions of input structures rejected by $\bar{\Pi}$.*
2. *There exists a polynomial $r(n)$ such that the number of microsteps in every run of $\bar{\Pi}$ on an input structure of size n is bounded by $r(n)$.*

Proof. 1. The desired Turing machine simulates the given PTime program. The bound r in a term $\{s(v) : v \in r : g(v)\}$ and in a do-forall rule ensures that the number of immediate subcomputations is bounded by the number of active elements and thus by $q(n)$. This yields a polynomial bound on the work needed to simulate one transition in the run. Since the number of transitions is bounded by $p(n)$, the whole simulation takes only polynomial time.

2. Since the number of macrosteps is bounded by a polynomial, it suffices to check that the number of microsteps needed to fire an arbitrary rule R is bounded by a polynomial. This is done by an obvious induction on R. $\quad\square$

Part 1 of the theorem gives the following corollary.

Corollary 4. *Every $\tilde{C}$PTime pair of structure classes (K_1, K_2) is separated by a PTime class.*

5.3. A lower bound for $\tilde{C}$PTime

In the previous subsection, we have shown that our definition of $\tilde{C}$PTime is not too broad. One may also worry that it is too narrow, that – because of the use of transitive

closure in the definition of active objects – it is possible to create a large number of active objects in short time. If this happened, then our definition, bounding the number of active objects, would be more restrictive than the intuitive idea of bounding the number of microsteps. The purpose of this subsection is to show that this problem does not arise.

Some active objects, namely atoms and $0, 1$, exist already in the initial state. The problem is to show that only polynomially many active nonempty sets can be created within polynomial honest computation time. We show that, under the definition of honest computation time hinted at above, the number of objects activated (that is the number of active objects which are inactive in the initial state) in any run of a PTime program is bounded by the honest computation time. The details of the definition of honest computation time are not important.

The idea of the proof is that every object that becomes active during a computation must be explicitly obtained during the computation, by evaluating some term in some expanded state. Since a microstep can explicitly evaluate at most one term, it will follow that the number of objects activated in a run is bounded by the honest computation time, as desired. Of course, this proof will require a definition of "explicitly obtained by evaluating some term". Furthermore, we shall need information about the order in which terms are (naturally) evaluated. The posets $\mathrm{Pre}(X, A)$ defined below are designed to incorporate just this information.

Consider a PTime program Π. Without loss of generality, we may assume that Π does not reuse variables, that is no variable is bound more than once. It follows that, in every subrule of Π, no variable is bound more than once and no variable occurs both free and bound. Define a *grounded term* to be a pair (t, A) where t is a term and A is an expanded state appropriate for t. Similarly, define a *grounded rule* to be a pair consisting of a rule and expanded state appropriate for it. Notice that a grounded term (t, A) has a value, namely $\mathrm{Val}_A(t)$.

The following definitions are intended to describe, for each grounded term or rule, say (X, A), a partially ordered set (poset) $\mathrm{Pre}(X, A)$ whose nodes are labeled with grounded terms that one would naturally evaluate in the course of evaluating X at A; the order of $\mathrm{Pre}(X, A)$ reflects the order in which one would evaluate the grounded terms. $\mathrm{Pre}(X, A)$ is similar to the parse tree of X, but there are some distinctions. To prevent the definitions from getting even longer than they are, we omit the grounded terms involved in evaluating guards; one could include them without any damage to our argument.

In fact, $\mathrm{Pre}(X, A)$ is not necessarily a tree. It will be convenient for our purposes that, for each free variable of X, there is at most one node with a label of the form (x, A) or $(x, A(\bar{v} \mapsto \bar{a}))$; this gives rise to the following auxiliary definition. Let P be a poset whose nodes are labeled with grounded terms, and let F be a collection of variables x such that each node with a label of the form (x, A) or $(x, A(\bar{v} \mapsto \bar{a}))$ is minimal in P and, if $\bar{v}$ is present, then it does not contain x. Then *adjusting P with respect to F* means merging, for each $x \in F$, all nodes of P with labels of the form (x, A) or $(x, A(\bar{v} \mapsto \bar{a}))$ into one node labeled with (x, A).

Define a *disjoint union of labeled posets* in the obvious way: order and the labels within each piece are preserved and elements of distinct pieces are incomparable. The constituent labeled posets will be called *summands*. Now we are ready to define posets $\mathrm{Pre}(X,A)$ by induction on X.

Definition 5. $\mathrm{Pre}(t,A)$ is defined by recursion on t.
- If t is a variable x, then $\mathrm{Pre}(t,A)$ is a singleton poset whose only node is labeled with (x,A).
- If t is $f(t_1,\ldots,t_j)$, then $\mathrm{Pre}(t,A)$ is obtained from the disjoint union of $\mathrm{Pre}(t_1,A),\ldots,$ $\mathrm{Pre}(t_j,A)$ by adding a (t,A)-labeled node at the top and adjusting the result with respect to the free variables of t.
- If t is $\{s(v):v\in r:g(v)\}$, then construct $\mathrm{Pre}(t,A)$ as follows. Form the disjoint union of $\mathrm{Pre}(s(v),A(v\mapsto a))$ for all $a\in\mathrm{Val}_A(r)$. Add a copy of $\mathrm{Pre}(r,A)$ below each $(v,A(v\mapsto a))$ if there are any; otherwise add a copy of $\mathrm{Pre}(r,A)$ to the disjoint union as a new summand. Adjoin a (t,A)-labeled node at the top. Adjust the result with respect to the free variables of t.

Note that $\mathrm{Pre}(t,A)$ always has the top node labeled with (t,A). Further, for each free variable x of t, there is at most one node labeled with (x,A) and this node (if present at all) is minimal in $\mathrm{Pre}(t,A)$.

Definition 6. $\mathrm{Pre}(R,A)$ is defined by recursion on R.
- If R is Skip, then $\mathrm{Pre}(R,A)=\emptyset$.
- If R is $f(t_1,\ldots,t_j):=t_0$, then construct $\mathrm{Pre}(R,A)$ as follows. Form the disjoint union of $\mathrm{Pre}(t_0,A),\ldots,$ $\mathrm{Pre}(t_j,A)$ and adjust the result with respect to the free variables of R.
- If R is "if g then R_1 else R_2 endif" then $\mathrm{Pre}(R,A)$ is $\mathrm{Pre}(R_1,A)$ or $\mathrm{Pre}(R_2,A)$ according to whether $\mathrm{Val}_A(g)$ is true or false.
- If R is "do forall $v\in r,\ R_0(v)$ enddo", then construct $\mathrm{Pre}(R,A)$ as follows. Form the disjoint union of $\mathrm{Pre}(R_0(v),A(v\mapsto a))$ for all $a\in\mathrm{Val}_A(r)$. Add a copy of $\mathrm{Pre}(r,A)$ below each $(v,A(v\mapsto a))$ if there are any; otherwise add a copy of $\mathrm{Pre}(r,A)$ to the disjoint union as a new summand. Adjust the result with respect to the set of free variables of R.

If (X,A) is a grounded term or rule, let $\mathrm{Val}[\mathrm{Pre}(X,A)]$ be the collection of objects $\mathrm{Val}_B(s)$ such that (s,B) is a label in $\mathrm{Pre}(X,A)$.

Lemma 7. 1. *If $\mathrm{Den}(R,A)$ contains an update $(f,(a_0,\ldots,a_{j-1}),a_j)$, then every $a_i\in\mathrm{Val}[\mathrm{Pre}(R,A)]$.*

2. *Suppose that (X,A) is a grounded term or rule with bound variable v. If (v,B) is a label in $\mathrm{Pre}(X,A)$, then B has the form $C(v\mapsto a)$ where $C=A(\bar{u}\mapsto\bar{b})$ and the variables $\bar{u}$ (if present at all) are all different from v.*

Proof. 1. Induction on R. 2. Induction on X. □

The labels of $\text{Pre}(X, A)$ are (some of the) grounded terms that would be evaluated when one evaluates X in A. At least one unit of honest computation time should be spent to evaluate each of the labels. So if a run $\langle A_0, \ldots, A_l \rangle$ of the program Π takes honest computation time T, then

$$\text{Card}\left(\bigcup_i \text{Val}[\text{Pre}(\Pi, A_i)]\right) \leqslant T.$$

Theorem 8. *Consider a run* $\rho = \langle A_0, \ldots, A_l \rangle$ *of* Π. *Every object* x *activated in* ρ *belongs to* $\bigcup_i \text{Val}[\text{Pre}(\Pi, A_i)]$.

Proof. Call the sets $0, 1$ binary and let x be an active non-binary set in ρ. In view of the convention about dynamic functions in initial states, A_0 has no critical non-binary sets and thus no active non-binary sets. Let i be the first index such that x is active in A_{i+1}. So there is a non-binary set y, critical for A_{i+1}, with $x \in \text{TC}(y)$. Since y is not critical for A_i, there must be an update, executed in the step from A_i to A_{i+1}, involving y as either the new value or a component of the location. By Lemma 7, $y \in \text{Val}[\text{Pre}(\Pi, A_i)]$. Among all nodes n in $\text{Pre}(\Pi, A_i)$ such that $x \in \text{TC}(\text{Val}(\text{Label}(n)))$, choose a minimal one. Call this node n_0 and let $(t, B) = \text{Label}(n_0)$. Our goal is to show that $\text{Val}_B(t) = x$. So suppose this fails. Then there exists $w \in \text{Val}_B(t)$ such that $x \in \text{TC}(w)$. (This includes the possibility that $x = w$.) As x is a non-binary set, w is a non-binary set. We consider the various possibilities for t and deduce a contradiction in every case. Note that B is an expansion of A_i.

Suppose that t has the form $f(\bar{s})$ for a dynamic f. Then $\text{Val}_B(t)$ is critical already in A_i and therefore x is active in A_i, contrary to our choice of i.

Suppose that t is $\emptyset$ or Atoms. This is absurd, as $\text{Val}_B(t)$ contains a nonbinary set w.

Suppose that t is $\bigcup s$. Since $w \in \text{Val}_B(t) = \bigcup \text{Val}_B(s)$, we have $w \in u \in \text{Val}_B(s)$ for some u. Since $x \in \text{TC}(w)$, we have $x \in \text{TC}(\text{Val}_B(s))$. But $\text{Pre}(t, B)$ has a node labeled (s, B) and thus there is a node labeled (s, B) below n_0 in $\text{Pre}(\Pi, A)$. This contradicts the choice of n_0.

Suppose t is $\{s_1, s_2\}$. Then $x \in \text{TC}(w) = \text{TC}(\text{Val}_B(s))$ for some $s \in \{s_1, s_2\}$. The rest is as in the $\bigcup$ case.

Suppose that t is TheUnique(s). Since $\text{Val}_B(t)$ is a set (not an atom), TheUnique$(s) = \bigcup(s)$ here, and we get a contradiction as in the $\bigcup$ case.

Suppose that t is $P(\bar{s})$ where P is a predicate name. According to our presentation of truth values, $\text{Val}_B(t)$ is either $\emptyset$ or $\{\emptyset\}$. In the first case, we get a contradiction as in the $\emptyset$ case. In the second case, $w = \emptyset$ which is impossible as $\text{TC}(w)$ contains a nonbinary set x.

Suppose that t is $\{s(v) : v \in r : g(v)\}$. Since $w \in \text{Val}_B(t)$, there is some $a \in \text{Val}_B(r)$ such that $\text{Val}_{B(v \mapsto a)}(g(v)) = \texttt{true}$ and $\text{Val}_{B(v \mapsto a)}(s(v)) = w$. Recall that $x \in \text{TC}_B(w)$. But

Pre(t, B) has a node labeled $(s(v), B(v \mapsto a))$ and thus there is a node labeled $(s(v),$ $B(v \mapsto a))$ below n_0 in Pre(Π, A). This contradicts the choice of n_0.

Finally, suppose that t is a variable v. As Π is a program and thus has no free variables, v is bound in Π. Since Π does not reuse variables, v is bound exactly once, either by a $\{s(v) : v \in r : g(v)\}$ construction or by a do-forall. Let r be the range of v. By Lemma 7, B must be $C(v \mapsto a)$, where C is an expansion of A_i that involves only variables different from v and where $a \in \mathrm{Val}_C(r)$. So $\mathrm{Val}_B(t) = \mathrm{Val}_{C(v \mapsto a)}(v) = a \in \mathrm{Val}_C(r)$. Thus, $x \in \mathrm{TC}(\mathrm{Val}_C(r))$. But Pre$(\Pi, A)$ includes a copy of Pre(r, C), whose top node is labeled with (r, C), *below* node n_0. This contradicts the minimality of n_0. □

Corollary 9. *Let $\bar{\Pi}$ be a PTime program $(\Pi, p(n), q(n))$, and let ρ be the run of $\bar{\Pi}$ on some input structure I. The number of objects active in ρ is bounded by the number of microsteps plus the number of atoms plus two.*

Proof. Except for $0, 1$, and atoms, everything active in ρ is activated in ρ. The theorem and the observation preceding it immediately give the desired bound. □

5.4. The robustness of $\tilde{C}$PTime

We have considered two definitions of PTime programs: the official definition by means of active elements, and the counting-microsteps definition. Even though details of the second definition have been skipped, we have shown in the previous two subsections that the two definitions are equivalent in the sense that they give rise to the same notion of $\tilde{C}$PTime.

There is another natural definition of PTime programs. Fix a program Π, and call an object x *relevant* to a state A of Π if it is active at A or there exists a dynamic function f such that $x \in \mathrm{TC}(\mathrm{Extent}(f))$ in A. (Extents were defined in Section 4.2.) Call x *relevant* to a run ρ of Π if it is relevant to some state of ρ.

A PTime program can be defined as a pair $(\Pi, r(n))$ where Π is a program and $r(n)$ is a polynomial that bounds the number of relevant objects in Π's runs. If ρ is the run of Π on an initial structure I, then the run of $(\Pi, r(n))$ on I is the maximal initial segment ρ_0 of ρ such that (1) the number of objects relevant to ρ_0 is bounded by $r(n)$, and (2) all states of ρ_0 are distinct. The second clause is needed to ensure that ρ_0 is finite in the case when Π loops on I.

Theorem 10. *The active-object and relevant-object definitions give the same notion of $\tilde{C}$PTime.*

Proof. First, let $(\Pi, r(n))$ be a PTime program with respect to the relevant-object definition, and let ρ be the run of $(\Pi, r(n))$ on an input structure I of size n. Clearly, $r(n)$ bounds the number of active objects in Π's runs. It suffices to show that the length of ρ is bounded by a polynomial of n that is independent of I.

Let m be the number of dynamic names in $\mathrm{Voc}(\Pi)$, and let f range over dynamic functions of Π. A state in ρ is uniquely determined by the relevant sets $\mathrm{Extent}(f)$. Hence the number of different states in ρ is at most $r(n)^m$.

Second, let $(\Pi, p(n), q(n))$ be a PTime program with respect to the active-object definition, and let ρ be the run of $(\Pi, p(n), q(n))$ on an input structure I of size n. It suffices to show that the number of objects relevant to ρ is bounded by a polynomial of n that is independent of I.

Let m be the number of dynamic functions in Π and let j be the maximum of their arities. A relevant object x has one of the following two forms. First, x may be $\mathrm{Extent}(f)$ for some dynamic function f. There at most $mp(n)$ relevant objects of that sort. Second, x may be a k-tuple of active objects, $k \leqslant j + 1$, or a member of the transitive closure of such a tuple. Obviously, there is a polynomial bound on the number of such relevant objects. $\quad\square$

6. Two fixed-point theorems

The main purpose of this section is to show that any $\tilde{\mathrm{C}}$PTime computation over an input structure I can be described in the logic FO+LFP over any transitive set that contains the active elements. (The relations of I are to be viewed as relations on that transitive set.) This fact, along with the translation of FO+LFP into $L^{\omega}_{\infty,\omega}$, will be used in obtaining our negative results about $\tilde{\mathrm{C}}$PTime computability in Section 10.

6.1. Definable set-theoretic functions

The ASM programming language allows one to use much of the usual set-theoretic notation. Here are some examples.

Lemma 11. *Over ASM states, every first-order formula with bounded quantifiers is expressible by a Boolean term.*

Proof. An easy induction over the given formula. In particular, $(\exists v \in r)\ g(v) \Leftrightarrow 0 \in \{0 : v \in r : g(v)\}$. $\quad\square$

Lemma 12. *The function*

$$\textit{if } y \textit{ then } x_1 \textit{ else } x_2 = \begin{cases} x_1 & \textit{if } y \neq 0 \\ x_2 & \textit{if } y = 0 \end{cases}$$

is definable

Proof.

$$\mathrm{TheUnique}(\{v : v \in \{x_1, x_2\} : (y \neq 0 \wedge v = x_1) \vee (y = 0 \wedge v = x_2)\}). \quad\square$$

Lemma 13. *Operations $x \cup y$, $\bigcap x$, $x - y$ are definable.*

Proof.

$$x \cup y = \bigcup \{x, y\}$$
$$\bigcap x = \left\{ v : v \in \bigcup x : (\forall w \in x) v \in w \right\}$$
$$x - y = \{w : w \in x : w \notin y\}. \qquad \square$$

The standard Kuratowski definition of ordered pairs is

$$\mathrm{OP}(x, y) = \{\{x\}, \{x, y\}\}.$$

Lemma 14. *There are definable functions* P1 *and* P2 *satisfying the following condition. If $z = \mathrm{OP}(x, y)$, then* $\mathrm{P1}(z) = x$ *and* $\mathrm{P2}(z) = y$.

Proof.

$$\mathrm{P1}(z) = \mathrm{TheUnique}\left(\bigcap z\right)$$
$$\mathrm{P2}(z) = \left(\text{if } \bigcup z = \bigcap z \text{ then } \mathrm{P1}(z) \text{ else } \mathrm{TheUnique}\left(\bigcup z - \bigcap z\right) \right). \qquad \square$$

We will use the following lemma. Every nonempty transitive set T is a natural model of the vocabulary $\{\in, \emptyset\}$; this model will be also called T.

Lemma 15. *There exists a formula PosInteger(x) in the vocabulary $\{\in \emptyset\}$ such that, for every transitive set T and every $x \in T$,*

$$T \models \mathrm{PosInteger}(x) \iff x \text{ is a positive integer.}$$

Proof. First express that x is a natural number: x is transitive and either 0 or of the form $z \cup \{z\}$, and the same is true for each $y \in x$. PosInteger(x) asserts that x is a natural number and $x \neq 0$. $\square$

6.2. First-order semantics

The sequel of a given state with respect to a given program can be described in the given state by means of first-order formulas [11]. We need here a related result.

Lemma 16. *For every rule R and every dynamic function name f, there is a first-order formula Update$_{R,f}(\bar{x}, y)$ such that*

$$A \models \mathrm{Update}_{R,f}(\bar{x}, y) \iff (f, \bar{x}, y) \in \mathrm{Den}(R, A) \text{ and } \mathrm{Den}(R, A) \text{ is consistent}$$

for all appropriate expanded states A.

The appropriateness of A means that A is appropriate for R and its vocabulary contains the name f which may or may not occur in R.

Proof of Lemma 16. We first define a simpler formula $\text{Update}'_{R,f}(\bar{x}, y)$ expressing that $(f, \bar{x}, y) \in \text{Den}(R, A)$ without worrying about consistency, and then we adjust it to take consistency into account.

$\text{Update}'_{R,f}$ is defined by induction on R. If R is Skip or an update rule with head name different from f, then $\text{Update}'_{R,f}$ is any logically false formula. If R is $f(\bar{t}) := t_0$, then $\text{Update}'_{R,f}$ is

$$(\bar{x} = \bar{t} \land y = t_0).$$

If R is "if g then R_1 else R_2 endif", then $\text{Update}'_{R,f}$ is

$$(g = \texttt{true} \land \text{Update}'_{R_1,f}) \lor (g = \texttt{false} \land \text{Update}'_{R_2,f}).$$

If R is "do-forall $u \in r$, $R_0(u)$ enddo", then $\text{Update}'_{R,f}$ is

$$(\exists u \in r)\text{Update}'_{R_0(u),f}.$$

Next, to take consistency into account, let

$$\text{Clash}_R = \bigvee_{h \in \Upsilon} \text{Clash}_{R,h}$$

where $\text{Clash}_{R,h}$ is

$$\exists \bar{z} \exists w \exists w' [\text{Update}'_{R,h}(\bar{z}, w) \land \text{Update}'_{R,h}(\bar{z}, w') \land w \neq w'].$$

Here $\text{Length}(\bar{z}) = \text{Arity}(h)$.

Finally, define $\text{Update}_{R,f}(\bar{x}, y)$ to be $\text{Update}'_{R,f}(\bar{x}, y) \land \neg\text{Clash}_R$. □

6.3. Time-explicit programs

Call a PTime program Π *time-explicit* if every positive integer i is active in all runs of Π of length $\geq i$.

Lemma 17. *Every* PTime *program can be simulated by a time-explicit* PTime *program.*

Proof. Just alter the given program Π to

```
do-in-parallel
  Π
  if not(Halt) then
    CT := CT ∪ {CT}
  endif
enddo
```

where CT (an allusion to Current Time) is a fresh nullary dynamic function name (automatically initialized to 0, according to our conventions). The polynomial bounds attached to the original program Π must be increased somewhat to accommodate the additional work done by the CT clock. It does no harm to increase those bounds somewhat generously, since the definition of simulation at the end of Section 3 allows the simulating machine to accept or reject inputs for which the original machine did neither. $\square$

6.4. Fixed-point definability

Fix a PTime program $\bar{\Pi} = (\Pi, p(n), q(n))$ where Π is time-explicit. Let I range over input structures for Π. Define Active(I) to be the collection of active objects in the run of $\bar{\Pi}$ on I. It is easy to see that Active(I) is transitive. We also denote by Active(I) the structure (Active(I), $\in$, $\emptyset$, $\bar{R}$) where $\bar{R}$ stands for all the relations of the input structure I.

Theorem 18 (First Fixed-Point Theorem). *Let $\langle A_i: i \leqslant l \rangle$ be the run of $\bar{\Pi}$ on an input structure I. Relations*

$$D_f(i, \bar{x}, y) \iff A_i \models f(\bar{x}) = y \neq 0,$$

where f ranges over the dynamic function symbols in Π, are uniformly FO+LFP definable in Active(I).

The uniformity means that the defining formulas are independent of I.

Proof. Notice that if i is a positive integer then $i - 1 = \bigcup i$. For clarity, we will use $i - 1$ instead of $\bigcup i$ in the situations where i is a positive integer.

Call a first-order formula φ *simple* if every atomic subformula of φ has the form $f(\bar{x}) = t$ where $\bar{x}$ is a tuple of variables and t is either a variable or `true` or `false`. It is easy to see that every first-order formula whose vocabulary consists of function names is logically equivalent to a simple formula. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the formulas $\text{Update}_{R,f}(\bar{x}, y)$, constructed in the previous subsection, are simple.

By simultaneous recursion, we define relations D_f, where f ranges over the dynamic function names of Π:

$$D_f(i, \bar{x}, y) \iff \text{PosInteger}(i) \wedge y \neq 0$$

$$\wedge [(D_f(i - 1, \bar{x}, y) \wedge \neg(\exists z \neq y)U_f(i - 1, \bar{x}, z)) \vee U_f(i - 1, \bar{x}, y)]$$

Here $U_f(j, \bar{x}, y)$ is the formula $\text{Update}_{\Pi,f}(\bar{x}, y)$ where each atomic subformula $h(\bar{u}) = t$ is replaced with

$$D_h(j, u, t) \vee [t = 0 \wedge \neg(\exists y)D_h(j, u, y)]. \qquad \square$$

The First Fixed-Point Theorem remains true if the computation time of the given program is bounded by any other function (not necessarily a polynomial) or is not bounded at all. Also, we get the same definability in any transitive T that includes Active(I).

Theorem 19 (Second Fixed-Point Theorem). *Restrict attention to input structures I such that $\bar{\Pi}$ halts on I. Then the set* Active(I) *is uniformly* FO+LFP *definable in* HF(BaseSet(I)).

Proof. We first produce an FO+LFP formula expressing that x is critical in the run of Π on I. This formula asserts that x is an atom, or $x \in \{0, 1\}$, or the following is true for some dynamic function f where $k = \text{Arity}(f)$.

$$(\exists i, v_0, \ldots, v_k)[D_f(i, v_0, \ldots, v_k) \wedge (v_0 = x \vee \cdots \vee v_k = x) \wedge (\forall j \in i)\neg D_{\text{Halt}}(j, \texttt{true})].$$

Using this definition of critical, we can define Active(I) by a formula saying that x belongs to every transitive set that contains every critical y. □

7. On the extent of $\check{\text{C}}$PTime

We show, in particular, that PTime abstract state machines are more powerful than the PTime relational machines of Abiteboul–Vianu.

Theorem 20. *For every* PTime *relational machine* Ξ, *there exists a* PTime *ASM program* Π *that accepts all input structures accepted by* Ξ *and rejects all input structures rejected by* Ξ.

Proof. If Ξ has m instructions, then the desired program Π is a do-in-parallel rule with m components. Each component simulates one instruction of Ξ. □

To show that choiceless polynomial-time computations are strictly more powerful than polynomial-time relational machines, we shall exhibit two classes of structures that can be separated by the former but not by the latter.

It would be easy to give a trivial example, based on the fact that for relational machines "polynomial time" is measured relative to the size of a quotient structure obtained by identifying indistinguishable elements of the input structure. If this quotient is much smaller than the actual input structure, then "polynomial time" is a much more stringent restriction for the relational machine than for our framework. We are interested, however, not in this trivial difference between the conventions of the two models but in actual computational differences. We therefore use in our example only structures where the quotient structure is nearly as large as the original, so that "polynomial" has the same meaning for both models.

The vocabulary for our example consists of a unary predicate symbol P and a binary predicate symbol $<$. Let K be the class of structures A in which (1) the interpretation

P^A of P is small in the sense that $|P^A|! \leqslant |A|$ and (2) $<$ linearly orders $A - P^A$. Thus a structure in K consists of a large linearly ordered part plus a small naked set P^A. Let K_0 resp. K_1 be the subclasses of K consisting of structures where the cardinality of P^A is even resp. odd.

Because $A - P^A$ is ordered, all its elements remain distinct in the quotient structure used as the measure of input size in the relational model. Since P^A is small, the quotient is of size comparable to A; in particular, polynomial relative to the quotient structure is the same as polynomial relative to the original structure. This observation is our only reason for including $<$ in our structures.

Theorem 21. *The classes K_0 and K_1 can be separated by* $\tilde{C}$PTime.

Proof. Let us begin with some wishful thinking. If the structures included an ordering of P^A, then we could use it to obtain the parity of $|P^A|$ just by counting. For example, we could use two 0-ary names p and q, where p is a set that is initially empty and, in each execution of the program, acquires as a new member the first element of P^A not already in p (until $p = P^A$), while q alternates between 0 and 1. (This wishful thinking is, of course, just a special case of the fact that, on ordered structures, $\tilde{C}$PTime captures PTime because it can simulate the least fixed point operator.)

In reality, however, no ordering of P^A is available, so the wishful thinking of the preceding paragraph cannot succeed. Our ASM model can, however, produce the set X of all linear orderings of P^A; the following program does the job in a run of length $|P^A|$.

```
if Mode = Final then
  skip
elseif   (∀x ∈ Atoms)(∀u ∈ X)[P(x) ⇒ (x,x) ∈ u]   then
  Mode := Final
else
  X := {u ∪ {(x, y) : (x,x) ∈ u  ∨  x = y} : u ∈ X ∧  P(y) ∧  (y, y) ∉ u}
endif
```

The number of objects activated by this program is bounded by a linear function of $|P^A|!$ and is therefore bounded by a polynomial (in fact linear) function of $|A|$ for $A \in K$. This is the reason for considering structures that are so much bigger than the interpretation of P; polynomial time relative to $|A|$ is enough to produce all the linear orderings of P^A.

Finally, after producing the set X of all linear orderings of P^A, we can run many copies of the "wishful thinking" algorithm in parallel, one copy for each ordering in X. When they all halt, i.e., when their p's stop growing, their q's all agree, and this common value gives the parity of P^A. □

Lemma 22. *The classes K_0 and K_1 cannot be separated by a polynomial-time relational machine.*

Proof. It is known [3] that the operation of any polynomial-time relational machine can be described by a sentence of the finite variable infinitary language $L_{\infty\omega}^{\omega}$. But an easy pebble-game argument shows that an m-variable infinitary sentence cannot distinguish two structures $A, B \in K$ as long as their ordered parts $A - P^A$ and $B - P^B$ have the same size and their unordered parts P^A and P^B have size at least m. Thus, such a sentence cannot separate K_0 from K_1. $\square$

Thus PTime abstract state machines are more powerful than PTime relational machines.

Remark. Theorem 21 can be strengthened by replacing the restriction $|P^A|! \leqslant |A|$ with $2^{|P^A|} \leqslant |A|$. The idea is to compute the set of 2-element subsets of P^A, then extend it with the set of all 4-element subsets of P^A, then extend the result with the set of all 6-element subsets of P^A, and so on. When this computation converges, check if the result contains P^A.

Theorem 21 and its proof apply in much greater generality than stated above. Once the set X of linear orderings of P^A has been produced, the program can go on to simulate any PTime Turing machine operating on input P^A. Thus, any PTime computable property of structures becomes $\tilde{C}$PTime computable when the input structure for the $\tilde{C}$PTime computation has the input of the Turing computation as a small, definable substructure. Here "small" is defined using the factorial function, as in the theorem.

Furthermore, the theorem and its proof can be extended to cover the situation where P^A is not merely a subset of the input structure but rather a set that can be produced in polynomial time by an ASM. For example, if the input structures are groups G then it might be the commutator subgroup G' or the quotient G/G'.

8. The support theorem

The goal of this and the next sections is to show that the parity of a naked set is not $\tilde{C}$PTime computable. Thus the inclusion of $\tilde{C}$PTime in PTime (see Theorem 3) is proper; "choiceless" is a real restriction. The present section is devoted to establishing a limitation on the sets that can be activated by a $\tilde{C}$PTime computation over a naked set. This limitation is used in the next sections to prove the negative result about parity. The same method will also yield other negative results.

Consider a PTime program Π and let I be an input structure for Π. The recipe $\theta(x) = \{\theta(y): y \in x\}$ extends any automorphism θ of I to an automorphism of the whole initial state State(I) generated by I. It is easy to see that every automorphism of State(I) can be obtained this way. Indeed, an automorphism θ' of State(I) coincides, on I, with some automorphism θ of I; by induction on Rank(x), check that $\theta'(x) = \theta(x)$ for all $x \in$ State(I).

Definition 23. A set X of atoms of I is a *support* of an object $y \in$ State(I) if every automorphism of I that pointwise fixes X fixes y as well.

For example, the set of atoms in $TC(y)$ is a support of y. But y may also have other, far smaller supports. For example, the empty set is a support of the set of all atoms.

Let $\mathrm{Active}(I)$ be the set of active objects in the run of Π on I. It is easy to see that $\mathrm{Active}(I)$ is transitive and closed under automorphisms of $\mathrm{State}(I)$. Let $\mathrm{Active}^{+}(I)$ be the substructure of $\mathrm{State}(I)$ with base set $\mathrm{Active}(I)$.

Theorem 24 (Support Theorem). *Assume that the input vocabulary of Π is empty. There exists a number k such that, for all sufficiently large I, every object in $\mathrm{Active}(I)$ has a support of cardinality $\leqslant k$.*

To avoid interruption of the natural flow of the proof, we start with a version of a known combinatorial lemma which will be used later in the proof. Recall that a *Δ-system* is a collection K of sets such that $X \cap Y$ is the same set for all $X \neq Y$ in K.

Lemma 25. *Any indexed family F of $\geqslant l!\, p^{l+1}$ sets (not necessarily distinct), each of size $\leqslant l$, includes a Δ-system of p sets.*

Proof. (By induction on l) If $l = 0$, then F itself is a Δ-system. Assume that $l > 0$ and the result holds for $l - 1$.

Case 1: There exists a point x that belongs to $\geqslant (l-1)!\, p^{l}$ sets in F, say sets X_i, $i \in I$. Apply the induction hypothesis to the family $\{X_i - \{x\} : i \in I\}$, to extract a Δ-system of p sets $\{X_i - \{x\} : i \in J\}$. The family $\{X_i : i \in J\}$ is the desired Δ-system.

Case 2: Each point belongs to $< (l-1)!\, p^{l}$ sets in F. In this case, we find p pairwise disjoint members of F; they form the desired Δ-system. Notice that each member of F intersects $< l(l-1)!\, p^{l} = l!\, p^{l}$ other members and that $\mathrm{Card}(F)/(l!\, p^{l}) \geqslant p$. Pick a member X_1 arbitrarily, and then eliminate those members that meet X_1. Pick a member X_2 among the remaining members arbitrarily, and then eliminate those members that meet X_2. And so on. □

Proceeding toward the proof of the support theorem, let Π be as in its hypothesis. So the input structure I is a naked set and automorphisms of I are simply permutations of I. Let $\mathscr{A} = \mathrm{Active}(I)$.

Lemma 26. *If X_1, X_2 support y and $X_1 \cup X_2 \neq I$, then $X_1 \cap X_2$ supports y as well.*

Proof. Suppose that X_1, X_2 support y. Fix an atom $a \in I - (X_1 \cup X_2)$. Let b range over $I - (X_1 \cap X_2)$ and π_b be the transposition of atoms that interchanges a and b. For each b, either $b \notin X_1$ or $b \notin X_2$. In the first case π_b pointwise fixes X_1, and in the second it pointwise fixes X_2. In either case, it fixes y. It is easy to see that the transpositions π_b generate all permutations of atoms which pointwise fix $X_1 \cap X_2$. Hence the automorphisms induced by permutations π_b generate all automorphisms of $\mathscr{A}$ that fix $X_1 \cap X_2$. Hence every such automorphism fixes y. □

Let $n = \text{Card}(I)$. Lemma 26 justifies the following definition. If object y has a support X with $|X| < n/2$, then the set

$$\text{Supp}(y) = \bigcap \{X : X \text{ supports } y \text{ and } |X| < n/2\}$$

is the smallest support of y.

Since Π is PTime, there exists a bound n^k on $\text{Card}(\mathscr{A})$. Fix such a k and assume that n is so large that $\binom{n}{k+1} > n^k$.

Lemma 27. *If $x \in \mathscr{A}$ has a support of size $< n/2$, then $|\text{Supp}(x)| \leqslant k$.*

Proof. Suppose that x has a support of size $< n/2$ and $s = |\text{Supp}(x)|$. If an automorphism θ moves x to some y, then it moves $\text{Supp}(x)$ to $\text{Supp}(y)$. If $s > k$, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
n^k &\geqslant \text{Card}(\mathscr{A}) \geqslant \text{Card}\{\theta(x) : \theta \in \text{Aut}(\mathscr{A})\} \\
&\geqslant \text{Card}\{\theta(\text{Supp}(x)) : \theta \in \text{Aut}(\mathscr{A})\} \\
&= \binom{n}{s} \geqslant \binom{n}{k+1} > n^k. \qquad \square
\end{aligned}
$$

In order to prove the theorem, it suffices to prove the following lemma.

Lemma 28. *If n is sufficiently large, then every member of $\mathscr{A}$ has a support of size $< n/2$.*

Proof. Toward a contradiction, assume that the lemma fails and let x be an object of minimal rank in $\mathscr{A}$ without support of size $< n/2$. Clearly, x is a set and each member of x has a support of size $< n/2$. Let $m = \lfloor n/(4k) \rfloor$.

Claim 29. *There exists a sequence $\langle (\theta_j, y_j, z_j, Y_j, Z_j) : 1 \leqslant j \leqslant m \rangle$ such that every initial segment $\langle (\theta_i, y_i, z_i, Y_i, Z_i) : 1 \leqslant i \leqslant j \rangle$ satisfies the following conditions*:
- θ_j *is an automorphism of $\mathscr{A}$, and y_j, z_j are objects in $\mathscr{A}$, and $Y_j = \text{Supp}(y_j)$, $Z_j = \text{Supp}(z_j)$.*
- $y_j \in x$, $z_j \notin x$.
- θ_j *fixes $Y_i \cup Z_i$ pointwise for all $i < j$, and $\theta_j(y_j) = z_j$, and θ_j maps Y_j onto Z_j.*

Proof. We construct the tuples by induction on j. Suppose that a sequence $\langle (\theta_i, y_i, z_i, Y_i, Z_i) : 1 \leqslant i < j \rangle$, satisfying all the conditions, has been constructed. By the minimality of x, each y_i has a support of size $< n/2$. Since z_i is an automorphic image of y_i, the same applies to z_i. By the previous lemma, $|Y_i|, |Z_i| \leqslant k$.

Let $X_j = \bigcup_{i<j} (Y_i \cup Z_i)$. We have $|X_j| \leqslant (j-1)2k < (n/4k)2k = n/2$. If every automorphism θ that pointwise fixes $\bigcup_{i<j}(Y_i \cup Z_i)$ fixes x as well, then x has a support of size $< n/2$ and we have a contradiction. So there exists an automorphism θ that pointwise fixes X_j but moves x. It follows that there exists $y \in x$ such that the element $z = \theta(y)$ does not belong to x. (Otherwise $\theta(x) = \theta\{y : y \in x\} = \{\theta(y) : y \in x\} = x$.) Since $\theta(y) = z$, θ maps $\text{Supp}(y)$ onto $\text{Supp}(z)$. Choose, $\theta_j = \theta$, $y_j = y$ and $z_j = z$. $\square$

Let p be the largest integer with $(2k)! \, p^{2k+1} \leqslant m$. As n grows, both m and p grow (but k is fixed). For large enough n, we have

$$2^{p-1} > [((2k)!(p+1)^{2k+1} 4k)^k] \geqslant [((m+1)4k)^k] > n^k$$

Assume that n is sufficiently large, so that $2^{p-1} > n^k$.

Claim 30. *There exists a sequence* $\langle (\theta_j, y_j, z_j, Y_j, Z_j): 1 \leqslant j \leqslant p \rangle$ *such that*
- *every initial segment* $\langle (\theta_i, y_i, z_i, Y_i, Z_i): 1 \leqslant i \leqslant j \rangle$ *of the given sequence satisfies the three conditions of Claim 29, and*
- *The sets* $Y_i \cup Z_i$ *form a* Δ-*system.*

Proof. Let $\langle (\theta_j, y_j, z_j, Y_j, Z_j): 1 \leqslant j \leqslant m \rangle$ be as in Claim 29. By the induction hypothesis, each Y_i is of cardinality $\leqslant k$. Since Z_i is an automorphic image of Y_i, the same applies to Z_i. Thus $Y_i \cup Z_i \leqslant 2k$. Now apply Lemma 25. $\square$

Fix a sequence $\langle (\theta_j, y_j, z_j, Y_j, Z_j): 1 \leqslant j \leqslant p \rangle$ as in Claim 30, and let $X_0 = (Y_i \cup Z_i) \cap (Y_j \cup Z_j)$ for all $i \neq j$ in $[1, \dots, p]$. Let U be the integer interval $[2, \dots, p]$. If $i \in U$, then θ_i pointwise fixes $Y_1 \cup Z_1$ and therefore pointwise fixes X_0.

Claim 31. *For each* $V \subseteq U$, *there exists an automorphism* θ_V *such that*
- *if* $i \in V$, *then* $z_i = \theta_V(z_i)$.
- *if* $i \in U - V$, *then* $z_i = \theta_V(y_i)$.

Proof. Construct a permutation $\pi(a)$ of atoms as follows. If $a \in X_0$ then $\pi(a) = a$. If $a \in Y_i \cup Z_i$ for some $i \in V$, then $\pi(a) = a$. If $a \in Y_i$ for some $i \in U - V$ but $a \notin X_0$, then $\pi(a) = \theta_i(a)$, so that π maps Y_i onto Z_i. We do not care how π behaves on the remaining atoms. The desired θ_V is the automorphism induced by π. To see that it sends y_i to z_i for $i \in U - V$, observe that it agrees with θ_i on the support Y_i of y_i, that therefore $\pi^{-1}\theta_i$ fixes y_i, that θ_i sends y_i to z_i, and that therefore π^{-1} must send z_i to y_i. $\square$

Let the automorphisms θ_V be as in Claim 31.

Claim 32. *If* V, W *are different subsets of* U, *then* $\theta_V(x) \neq \theta_W(x)$.

Proof. Suppose that V and W are distinct. Without loss of generality, $V - W \neq \emptyset$. Pick some $i \in V - W$. We show that $z_i \in \theta_W(x) - \theta_V(x)$.
  Since $z_i \notin x$, $\theta_V(z_i) \notin \theta_V(x)$. Since $i \in V$, $z_i = \theta_V(z_i) \notin \theta_V(x)$.
  Since $y_i \in x$, $\theta_W(y_i) \in \theta_W(x)$. Since $i \in U - W$, $z_i = \theta_W(y_i) \in \theta_W(x)$. $\square$

By Claim 31, there are 2^{p-1} different automorphic images of x. Recall that n is sufficiently large, so that $2^{p-1} > n^k$. Hence $\mathrm{Card}(\mathscr{A}) \geqslant 2^{p-1} > n^k \geqslant \mathrm{Card}(\mathscr{A})$. This gives the desired contradiction. The Support Theorem is proved. $\square$

Define a *colored set* to be an input structure with only unary relations, called *colors*, which partition the base set, so that every atom (that is every element of the base set) belongs to exactly one color. We shall be interested in colored structures with a fixed number c of colors (i.e., the vocabulary is fixed), none of which are too small in proportion to the size of the whole set. Specifically, for any real number $\varepsilon > 0$, we call a colored set of size n ε-*level* if each color has cardinality at least $\varepsilon \cdot n$.

Corollary 33. *Assume that input structures for the* PTime *program Π are ε-level colored sets with c colors. There exists a number k, depending only on Π, ε, and c, such that, whenever the input structure I is sufficiently large, then every object in* $\mathrm{Active}_\Pi(I)$ *has a support of cardinality* $\leqslant k$.

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of the theorem. We indicate the more important changes. Throughout the proof, require permutations to preserve the colors, i.e., to be automorphisms of the colored set. In Lemma 26, require that $I - (X_1 \cup X_2)$ contains at least one atom of every color, so that the transpositions used in the proof can be taken to preserve colors.

In the definition of Supp(y), replace $|X| < n/2$ with the requirement

$$|X \cap C| < |C|/2 \quad \text{for all colors } C \qquad\qquad (*)$$

Accordingly, in Lemmas 27 and 28, instead of supports of size $< n/2$, speak about supports satisfying $(*)$. In connection with Lemma 27, first choose k' (rather than k) so that $n^{k'}$ bounds the number of active elements, and take n so large that $\binom{\varepsilon n}{k'+1} > n^{k'}$. The lemma then asserts that if $(*)$ holds then the support of X has at most k' elements in each color and therefore at most $k = ck'$ elements altogether. This is the k needed for the support theorem.

In the definition of m, replace n with the minimum of the color sizes. The rest of the proof remains valid.   □

Finally, let us note that, over some input structures, a PTime program can activate sets with no bounded support, so that the minimal support size depends on the input structure I, not only on the PTime program.

Example 34. Let I be the disjoint union of (i) a vector space V over the two-element field and (ii) a disjoint set S of size $\geqslant 2^{|V|}$. Let the program do the following with a dynamic nullary function Q. Initialize Q to $\{\{\bar{0}\}\}$ where $\bar{0}$ is the zero of V. Thereafter, for each $q \in Q$ and each $v \in V - q$, put into Q the subspace generated by $q \cup \{v\}$, except if this would make $V \in Q$, in which case halt and accept. On the first step, the program activates all one-dimensional subspaces of V; on the second, all two-dimensional subspaces; on the third, all three-dimensional subspaces, and so on. The length of the run equals the dimension of V. The number of active objects in the run is

$$|V| + |S| + |\text{Subspaces of } (V)| \leqslant |V| + 2|S| < 2|I|.$$

Thus a PTime version of Π accepts I. Notice that every hyperplane H of V is activated. But H has no support smaller than $\dim(V) - 1$.

9. The equivalence theorem

Fix an input vocabulary Υ_0 and let I, J denote input structures of vocabulary Υ_0. Recall that every automorphism of I naturally extends to an automorphism of $\mathrm{HF}(I)$ and that a subset X of $\mathrm{BaseSet}(I)$ supports an object $y \in \mathrm{HF}(I)$ if every automorphism of I that pointwise fixes X also fixes y. Given a positive integer k, call an object $y \in \mathrm{HF}(I)$ *k-symmetric* if every $z \in \mathrm{TC}(y)$ has a support of size $\leqslant k$. This terminology makes sense in the case of interest to us when many permutations of I fix a k-symmetric object y. Notice that every atom has a support of size one and thus is k-symmetric. Also the set of atoms has empty support, so it is k-symmetric for any k. But a linear ordering of the atoms is not k-symmetric unless k is at least equal to the number of atoms (in which case everything is k-symmetric). Let $\bar{I}_k$ denote the collection of k-symmetric objects in $\mathrm{HF}(I)$ as well as the corresponding structure of vocabulary $\Upsilon_0 \cup \{\in, \emptyset\}$.

We are interested in a special case when Υ_0 is empty and thus I, J are naked sets.

Theorem 35 (Equivalence Theorem). *Fix positive integers k and m. If naked sets I, J are sufficiently large, then structures $\bar{I}_k$ and $\bar{J}_k$ are $L^m_{\infty,\omega}$-equivalent.*

The theorem is proved in the rest of this section. We drop the subscript k and abbreviate "k-symmetric" to "symmetric". Without loss of generality, $m \geqslant 3$. We assume that the naked sets I, J have size $\geqslant km$ and construct a winning strategy for the Duplicator in $\mathrm{Game}_m(\bar{I}, \bar{J})$. The idea is to represent every symmetric object x as a combination of a form and matter. The form of an object x reflects a definition of x independent from the underlying sets of atoms. The matter of x is an ordered support of x.

9.1. Matter

Molecules. A *molecule* over a naked set I is an injective map $\sigma: k \to I$. In other words, a molecule is a sequence of k distinct atoms.

The configuration of a sequence of molecules. Consider a naked set I. The *configuration* $C(\bar{\sigma})$ of a finite sequence $\bar{\sigma} = (\sigma_0, \ldots, \sigma_{l-1})$ of molecules over I is the equivalence relation on $l \times k$ given by

$$(i, p) C(\bar{\sigma})(j, q) \Leftrightarrow \sigma_i(p) = \sigma_j(q).$$

The configuration describes how the ranges of the molecules overlap. By the injectivity, $(i, p) C(\bar{\sigma})(i, q) \Leftrightarrow p = q$. Notice that $C(\bar{\sigma})$ is uniquely determined by the configurations $C(\sigma_i, \sigma_j)$.

Abstract configurations. Let l be a natural number. An *l-ary configuration* is an equivalence relation E on $l \times k$ such that $(i, p)E(i, q) \Leftrightarrow p = q$. Every $C(\sigma_0, \ldots, \sigma_{l-1})$ is an l-ary configuration, and every l-ary configuration can be realized in this way. To prove the latter, assign a different atom $[i, p]$ to every equivalence class $(i, p)_E$ of E. Then set $\sigma_i(p) = [i, p]$.

Lemma 36. *Suppose that $l < m$, and $\sigma_0, \ldots, \sigma_l$ are molecules over I, and $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_l$ are molecules over J; $Q = C(\sigma_0, \ldots, \sigma_l)$ and $Q' = C(\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_l) = C(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_l)$. There exists a molecule τ_0 over J with $C(\tau_0, \ldots, \tau_l) = Q$.*

Proof. Define the desired τ_0 by setting

$$
\tau_0'(p) = \begin{cases}
\tau_1(q_1) & \text{if } (0, p)Q(1, q_1) \\
\tau_2(q_2) & \text{if } (0, p)Q(2, q_2) \\
\ldots & \\
\tau_l(q_l) & \text{if } (0, p)Q(l, q_l)
\end{cases}
$$

and then extending τ_0' to a full molecule τ_0 by using distinct values taken from $J - \bigcup_{i=1}^{l} \text{Range}(\tau_i)$. It is obvious that $C(\tau_0, \ldots, \tau_l) = Q$ provided that τ_0 is well-defined. Recall that $\text{Card}(J) \geqslant km$ and thus there exist enough distinct values to extend τ_0' to τ_0. In the rest of the proof, we check that τ_0' is well-defined.

First, we check that each $\tau_0'(p)$ is defined uniquely. Let $1 \leqslant i, j \leqslant l$ and suppose $(0, p)Q(i, q)$ and $(0, p)Q(j, s)$. Then $(i, q)Q(j, s)$, $(i, q)Q'(j, s)$, and therefore $\tau_i(q) = \tau_j(s)$.

Second, we check that τ_0' is injective. Let $1 \leqslant i, j \leqslant l$ and suppose that $\tau_0'(p) = \tau_0'(p')$ where $\tau_0'(p) = \tau_i(q)$ and $\tau_0'(p') = \tau_j(s)$. By the definition of τ_0', we have $(0, p)Q(i, q)$ and $(0, p')Q(j, s)$. Further, $\tau_i(q) = \tau_0'(p) = \tau_0'(p') = \tau_j(s)$, and hence $(i, q)Q'(j, s)$ and therefore $(i, q)Q(j, s)$. Putting this together, we have

$$
(0, p) \; Q \; (i, q) \; Q \; (j, s) \; Q \; (0, p')
$$

which implies $p = p'$. $\square$

9.2. Forms

The definition of forms. Fix a list $c_0, c_1, \ldots, c_{k-1}$ of new symbols. The set of *forms* is defined recursively as the smallest set containing the symbols c_p and containing every finite set of pairs (φ, E) where φ is a form and E is a binary configuration. If $\varphi = c_p$ then $\text{Rank}(\varphi) = 0$; otherwise

$$
\text{Rank}(\varphi) = 1 + \max\{\text{Rank}(\psi) : \text{some}(\psi, E) \in \varphi\}.
$$

Denotations. A form φ and a molecule σ over a naked set I uniquely define an object $\varphi *_I \sigma \in \text{HF}(I)$, which we may think of as the denotation of φ with respect

to σ. The subscript may be omitted in $*_I$ if the naked set is clear from the context. The definition is given by induction on φ.

- $c_p * \sigma = \sigma(p)$.
- If φ is a set, then $\varphi * \sigma = \{\psi * \tau : (\psi, C(\tau, \sigma)) \in \varphi\}$.

Permutations. Recall that any permutation π of I extends to an automorphism, also called π, of the structure $(HF(I), \in)$ by means of the following rule: $\pi(x) = \{\pi(y): y \in x\}$. Recall also that every automorphism of $HF(I)$ is obtained this way.

Lemma 37. *If π is a permutation of I, then $\pi(\varphi * \sigma) = \varphi * \pi\sigma$.*

Proof (By induction on φ). $\pi(c_p * \sigma) = \pi\sigma(p) = (\pi\sigma)(p) = c_p * (\pi\sigma)$. If φ is a set, then

$$
\begin{aligned}
\pi(\varphi * \sigma) &= \pi\{\psi * \tau : (\psi, C(\tau, \sigma)) \in \varphi\} = \{\pi(\psi * \tau): (\psi, C(\tau, \sigma)) \in \varphi\} \\
&= \{\psi * \pi\tau: (\psi, C(\tau, \sigma)) \in \varphi\} \quad \text{(by induction hypothesis)} \\
&= \{\psi * \rho: (\psi, C(\pi^{-1}\rho, \sigma)) \in \varphi\} \quad (\rho = \pi\tau) \\
&= \{\psi * \rho: (\psi, C(\rho, \pi\sigma)) \in \varphi\} \quad \text{(see below)} \\
&= \varphi * \pi\sigma.
\end{aligned}
$$

It remains to verify that $C(\pi^{-1}\rho, \sigma) = C(\rho, \pi\sigma)$:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&(0, p)C(\pi^{-1}\rho, \sigma)(1, q) \Leftrightarrow (\pi^{-1}\rho)(p) = \sigma(q) \Leftrightarrow \\
&\rho(p) = (\pi\sigma)(q) \Leftrightarrow (0, p)C(\rho, \pi\sigma)(1, q). \quad \square
\end{aligned}
$$

Corollary 38. *Every $\varphi *_I \sigma$ is symmetric and thus belongs to $\bar{I}$.*

Proof. Indeed, every $\varphi *_I \sigma$ is supported by $\text{Range}(\sigma)$ and thus has a support of size $\leqslant k$. The same conclusion applies to the members of the transitive closure of $\varphi *_I \sigma$ because they are of the form $\psi * \tau$. $\square$

Recall that I is a naked set of cardinality $\geqslant km$.

Lemma 39. *Every symmetric object x over I is equal to $\varphi *_I \sigma$ for some form φ and some molecule σ over I.*

Proof. Any atom x equals $c_0 * \sigma$ where σ is an arbitrary molecule with $\sigma(0) = x$. Proceeding inductively, suppose that x is a symmetric set with elements $y = \psi_y * \tau_y$. Since x is symmetric, there is a molecule σ whose range supports x. We will prove that $x = \varphi * \sigma$ where $\varphi = \{(\psi_y, C(\tau_y, \sigma)): y \in x\}$. One inclusion is easy. Suppose that $y \in x$. By the definition of $*_I$, $\varphi * \sigma = \{\psi * \tau: (\psi, C(\tau, \sigma)) \in \varphi\}$. By the definition of φ, $(\psi_y, C(\tau_y, \sigma)) \in \varphi$. Hence $y = \psi_y * \tau_y \in \varphi * \sigma$.

For the difficult direction, consider any $z \in \varphi * \sigma$. By the definition of $*_I$, z is a composition $\psi * \rho$ such that $(\psi, C(\rho, \sigma)) \in \varphi$. By the definition of φ, there exists a $y \in x$ such that $\psi = \psi_y$ and $C(\rho, \sigma) = C(\tau_y, \sigma)$. The latter equality does not imply that $\rho = \tau_y$ and we are not going to prove that $z = y$. Instead we construct an automorphism π of $\bar{I}$ that pointwise fixes σ and moves y to z. Since σ supports x, π fixes x; hence $z \in x$. It remains to construct such π.

We want that $\pi \tau_y = \rho$ and that π pointwise fixes Range(σ). To this end, define a function $\pi_0 : \mathrm{Range}(\tau_y) \cup \mathrm{Range}(\sigma) \to I$ by

$$\pi_0(a) = \begin{cases} \rho(p) & \text{if } a = \tau_y(p), \\ a & \text{if } a = \sigma(q). \end{cases}$$

Even though the two cases are not mutually exclusive, π_0 is well-defined. Indeed,

$$\tau_y(p) = \sigma(q) \Rightarrow (0, p)C(\tau_y, \sigma)(1, q) \Rightarrow (0, p)C(\rho, \sigma)(1, q) \Rightarrow \rho(p) = \sigma(q).$$

Furthermore, π_0 is injective. Indeed, assume that $\pi_0(a) = \pi_0(b)$. If $\pi_0(a) = \rho(p_1)$, $\pi_0(b) = \rho(p_2)$ then $p_1 = p_2$ (because ρ is injective) and therefore $a = \tau_y(p_1) = \tau_y(p_2) = b$. In case $a = \sigma(q_1)$, $b = \sigma(q_2)$, we have $a = \pi_0(a) = \pi_0(b) = b$. Finally suppose that $a = \tau_y(p)$, $b = \sigma(q)$. Then

$$\pi_0(a) = \pi_0(b) \Rightarrow \rho(p) = \sigma(q) \Rightarrow (0, p)C(\rho, \sigma)(1, q)$$
$$\Rightarrow (0, p)C(\tau_y, \sigma)(1, q) \Rightarrow \tau_y(p) = \sigma(q) \Rightarrow a = b.$$

Thus, function π_0 is one-to-one. Extend it to a permutation π over I in an arbitrary way. Since π extends π_0, it pointwise fixes Range(σ) and $\pi \tau_y = \rho$. In the standard way, π extends to an automorphism of $\bar{I}$ which will be denoted π as well. Since σ supports x (by the choice of σ), $\pi(x) = x$. By Lemma 37,

$$\pi(y) = \pi(\psi_y * \tau_y) = \psi_y * (\pi \tau_y) = \psi_y * \rho = z. \qquad \square$$

9.3. The In and Eq relations

Lemma 40. *There are ternary relations* Eq *and* In *such that, in every* $\bar{I}$,

$$\psi * \tau \in \varphi * \sigma \Leftrightarrow \mathrm{In}(\psi, \varphi, C(\tau, \sigma)), \tag{1}$$

$$\psi * \tau = \varphi * \sigma \Leftrightarrow \mathrm{Eq}(\psi, \varphi, C(\tau, \sigma)), \tag{2}$$

for all forms φ, ψ *and all molecules* σ, τ.

The crucial points here are that σ and τ are involved in In and Eq only via their configurations and that In and Eq do not depend on I.

Proof of Lemma 40. We define $\mathrm{In}(\psi, \varphi, E)$ and $\mathrm{Eq}(\psi, \varphi, E)$ by recursion on $\mathrm{Rank}(\psi) + \mathrm{Rank}(\varphi)$. It will be convenient to use the following notation. If Q is a ternary configuration and thus an equivalence relation on $3 \times k$, and if i and j are distinct elements of 3, then Q_{ij} is the binary configuration obtained by restricting Q to $\{i, j\} \times k$

and re-indexing i and j as 0 and 1, respectively. Thus, $(0, p)Q_{ij}(1, q)$ if and only if $(i, p)Q(j, q)$. With this notation, In and Eq are defined as follows.

$$\mathrm{In}(\psi, \varphi, E) \Leftrightarrow \varphi \text{ is a set and } (\exists \text{ form } \chi)$$
$$(\exists \text{ ternary configuration } Q \text{ with } Q_{12} = E)$$
$$[(\chi, Q_{02}) \in \varphi) \text{ and } \mathrm{Eq}(\psi, \chi, Q_{10})]$$

$$\mathrm{Eq}(\psi, \varphi, E) \Leftrightarrow \text{ either } (\exists p, q \in k)[\psi = c_p \wedge \varphi = c_q \wedge (0, p)E(1, q)],$$
$$\text{or } \varphi, \psi \text{ are sets and } (\forall \text{ form } \chi)$$
$$(\forall \text{ ternary configuration } Q \text{ with } Q_{12} = E)$$
$$[\text{if } (\chi, Q_{02}) \in \varphi \text{ then } \mathrm{In}(\chi, \psi, Q_{01}), \text{ and}$$
$$\text{if } (\chi, Q_{01}) \in \psi \text{ then } \mathrm{In}(\chi, \varphi, Q_{02})].$$

Assertions (1) and (2) of the lemma are proved simultaneously by induction on $\mathrm{Rank}(\psi) + \mathrm{Rank}(\varphi)$.

Proof of (1). If φ is a symbol c_p, then $\varphi * \sigma$ is an atom, so the left-hand side of (1) is false. So is the right-hand side, by the definition of In. Thus, we may assume from now on that φ is a set.

Suppose first that $\psi * \tau \in \varphi * \sigma$. By the definition of $*_I$, $\psi * \tau = \chi * \rho$ for some χ, ρ with $(\chi, C(\rho, \sigma)) \in \varphi$. By the induction hypothesis, $\mathrm{Eq}(\psi, \chi, C(\tau, \rho))$. We check that this χ and the ternary configuration $Q = C(\rho, \tau, \sigma)$ witness $\mathrm{In}(\psi, \varphi, C(\tau, \sigma))$. Indeed, $Q_{12} = C(\tau, \sigma)$, $(\chi, Q_{02}) = (\chi, C(\rho, \sigma)) \in \varphi$, and $\mathrm{Eq}(\psi, \chi, Q_{10})$ is $\mathrm{Eq}(\psi, \chi, C(\tau, \rho))$.

Conversely, suppose that $\mathrm{In}(\psi, \varphi, C(\tau, \sigma))$ is witnessed by χ and Q. By Lemma 36, there exists ρ such that $Q = C(\rho, \tau, \sigma)$. We have

$$(\chi, C(\rho, \sigma)) = (\chi, Q_{02}) \in \varphi, \text{ so that } \chi * \rho \in \varphi * \sigma; \text{ and}$$

$$\mathrm{Eq}(\psi, \chi, Q_{10}) \text{ holds, that is } \mathrm{Eq}(\psi, \chi, C(\tau, \rho)) \text{ holds.}$$

By the induction hypothesis, $\psi * \tau = \chi * \rho \in \varphi * \sigma$. Part (1) is proved.

Proof of (2). Both sides of (2) are false if one of ψ, φ is a symbol c_p while the other is a set. If $\varphi = c_q, \psi = c_p$, then

$$\psi * \tau = \varphi * \sigma \Leftrightarrow \tau(p) = \sigma(q) \Leftrightarrow (0, p)C(\tau, \sigma)(1, q)$$
$$\Leftrightarrow \mathrm{Eq}(\psi, \varphi, C(\tau, \sigma)).$$

So we may assume from now on that both ψ and φ are sets.

Suppose first that $\psi * \tau = \varphi * \sigma$. Let χ be any form and Q be any ternary configuration with $Q_{12} = C(\tau, \sigma)$. We must prove

$$(\chi, Q_{02}) \in \varphi \Rightarrow \mathrm{In}(\chi, \psi, Q_{01}),$$
$$(\chi, Q_{01}) \in \varphi \Rightarrow \mathrm{In}(\chi, \psi, Q_{02}).$$

By symmetry, it suffices to prove only the first of these two implications. So assume $(\chi, Q_{02}) \in \varphi$. By Lemma 36, there exists ρ such that $C(\rho, \tau, \sigma) = Q$. Then $(\chi, C(\rho, \sigma)) = (\chi, Q_{02}) \in \varphi$, so $\chi * \rho \in \varphi * \sigma = \psi * \tau$. By the induction hypothesis, $\mathrm{In}(\chi, \psi, C(\rho, \tau))$, that is $\mathrm{In}(\chi, \psi, Q_{01})$, as required.

Conversely, suppose that $\mathrm{Eq}(\psi, \varphi, C(\tau, \sigma))$ holds. By symmetry, it suffices to prove only that $\psi * \tau \subseteq \varphi * \sigma$. Let $\chi * \rho$, with $(\chi, C(\rho, \tau)) \in \psi$, be an arbitrary element of $\psi * \tau$. Apply the definition of $\mathrm{Eq}(\psi, \varphi, C(\tau, \sigma))$ with this χ and with $Q = C(\rho, \tau, \sigma)$, which satisfies $Q_{12} = C(\tau, \sigma)$. Since $(\chi, Q_{01}) = (\chi, C(\rho, \tau)) \in \psi$, we have $\mathrm{In}(\chi, \varphi, Q_{02})$, that is $\mathrm{In}(\chi, \varphi, C(\rho, \sigma))$. By the induction hypothesis, $\chi * \rho \in \varphi * \sigma$, as required. $\square$

9.4. The winning strategy

Now we are ready to construct a winning strategy for the Duplicator in $\mathrm{Game}_m(\bar{I}, \bar{J})$. The strategy is to ensure that, after every step, there exist forms φ_i, I-molecules σ_i and J-molecules τ_i, $i \in m$, such that

$$x_i = \varphi_i * \sigma_i, \quad y_i = \varphi_i * \tau_i, \quad C(\bar{\sigma}) = C(\bar{\tau}) \tag{$*$}$$

where x_i, y_i are elements covered by pebbles i in $\bar{I}, \bar{J}$ respectively. (Without loss of generality, we assume that, in the beginning, all $2m$ pebbles are on the board with all $x_i = y_i = \emptyset$.)

First we check that Duplicator can always play in the required manner. Clearly $(*)$ holds in the initial position, as we can take all $\varphi_i = \emptyset$, all $\sigma_i = \sigma_j$ and all $\tau_i = \tau_j$. Now suppose that, after some number of steps, $(*)$ holds witnessed by $\bar{\varphi}, \bar{\sigma}, \bar{\tau}$, and then Spoiler moves. By symmetry, we may assume that Spoiler moves pebble 0 on $\bar{I}$ from x_0 to x_0'. By Lemma 39, $x_0' = \varphi_0' *_I \sigma_0'$ for some form φ_0' and some molecule σ_0' over $\bar{I}$. By Lemma 36, there exists a molecule τ_0' over $\bar{J}$ such that $C(\sigma_0', \sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_{m-1}) = C(\tau_0', \tau_1, \ldots, \tau_{m-1})$. Duplicator can move pebble 0 on $\bar{J}$ from y_0 to $y_0' = \varphi_0' *_J \tau_0'$ and $(*)$ will be restored.

Second, we check that $(*)$ ensures that the map $x_i \mapsto y_i$ is a partial isomorphism and thus the proposed strategy of Duplicator is winning. For each $i, j \in m$, $(*)$ implies $C(\sigma_i, \sigma_j) = C(\tau_i, \tau_j)$. By Lemma 40,

$$x_i \in x_j \Leftrightarrow \varphi_i * \sigma_i \in \varphi_j * \sigma_j \Leftrightarrow \mathrm{In}(\varphi_i, \varphi_j, C(\sigma_i, \sigma_j))$$
$$\Leftrightarrow \mathrm{In}(\varphi_i, \varphi_j, C(\tau_i, \tau_j)) \Leftrightarrow \varphi_i * \tau_i \in \varphi_j * \tau_j$$
$$\Leftrightarrow y_i \in y_j$$

and similarly with $=$ and Eq in place of $\in$ and In.

The Equivalence Theorem is proved. $\square$

9.5. A generalization

Until now we have considered the case when the input vocabulary Υ_0 is empty. Now we consider the case when Υ_0 consists of unary predicates, say $P_0, \ldots, P_{c-1}$. Restrict

attention to input structures where the c basic relations partition the base set; recall that such input structures are called colored sets with colors $P_0, \ldots, P_{c-1}$. An automorphism of a colored set I is simply a color preserving permutation of the elements of I. Recall that $\bar{I}_k$ is the collection of k-symmetric elements of HF(I) as well as the corresponding structure of vocabulary $\{P_0, \ldots, P_{c-1}, \in, \emptyset\}$. We shall indicate how to modify the proof of the Equivalence Theorem to obtain the following version of it for colored sets.

Corollary 41. *Fix positive integers c, k, m. If I and J are colored sets, in each of which all the colors $P_0, \ldots, P_{c-1}$ are sufficiently large, then $\bar{I}_k$ and $\bar{J}_k$ are $L^m_{\infty,\omega}$-equivalent.*

Proof. To prove this, we need only make the following changes in the proof of the Equivalence Theorem for naked sets.

First, a configuration should specify not only how the ranges of molecules overlap but also the colors of the atoms in the molecules. Thus, the configuration $C(\bar{\sigma})$ of a finite sequence $\bar{\sigma} = (\sigma_0, \ldots, \sigma_{l-1})$ of molecules should be defined as a pair $(C_=(\bar{\sigma}), C_*(\bar{\sigma}))$ where $C_=(\bar{\sigma})$ is the equivalence relation on $l \times k$ that we previously called the configuration and where $C_*(\bar{\sigma})$ is the function $l \times k \to c$ sending each pair (i, p) to the unique r with $\sigma_i(p) \in P_r$. An abstract l-ary configuration is a pair E whose first component $E_=$ is what we previously called an abstract l-ary configuration and whose second component E_* is a function from $l \times k$ into c that is constant on every equivalence class of $E_=$.

Next, we check that Lemma 36 still holds with this new notion of configuration. Two things must be added to the earlier proof of the lemma: τ'_0 and σ_0 agree as to colors, and τ'_0 can be extended to τ_0 so as to maintain agreement with σ_0. The latter is clear because the colors P_r in our input structures are large enough. As for the former, we must prove that, if $i \geqslant 1$ and $(0, p)Q_=(i, q)$ then $\tau_i(q)$ has the same color as $\sigma_0(p)$. But from $(0, p)Q_=(i, q)$ we get $\sigma_0(p) = \sigma_i(q)$, and this element has the same color as $\tau_i(q)$ because $C(\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_l)_* = C(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_l)_*$.

In the statement of Lemma 37, "permutation" must be changed to "automorphism". The proof of that lemma is unchanged except that the computation verifying that $C(\pi^{-1}\rho, \sigma) = C(\rho, \pi\sigma)$ now verifies only that the $C_=$ components of the configurations agree. To get agreement of the C_* components, we use the fact that π is an automorphism and thus preserves colors.

The only other change in the earlier proof occurs in Lemma 39, where the difficult direction involved constructing a certain permutation π. In the colored situation, we must make sure that π is an automorphism. For this purpose, we first verify that the π_0 defined in the earlier proof preserves colors. For atoms a with $\pi_0(a) = a$, this is trivial, so we consider an atom a for which $a = \tau_y(p)$ and $\pi_0(a) = \rho(p)$. Because $C(\tau_y, \sigma) = C(\rho, \sigma)$, in particular the C_* components agree. So $\tau_y(p)$ has the same color as $\rho(p)$. But these atoms are a and $\pi_0(a)$, so π_0 preserves the color of a. Finally, when extending the map π_0 to an automorphism π, we must choose the extension so as to preserve colors, but this is trivially possible. $\square$

10. Negative results

10.1. Parity

Recall that a naked set is an input structure of the empty vocabulary.

Theorem 42 (Parity Theorem). *Parity is not in* $\tilde{C}$*PTime. Moreover, suppose that* K_1, K_2 *are disjoint infinite classes of naked sets, each containing sets of infinitely many cardinalities; then* (K_1, K_2) *is not* $\tilde{C}$*PTime.*

Proof. Let $\bar{\Pi}$ be any PTime ASM program with empty input vocabulary. We show that there are $I_1 \in K_1$ and $I_2 \in K_2$ such that $\bar{\Pi}$ does not distinguish between I_1 and I_2. By the Support Theorem in Section 8, there is a positive integer k such that, in every run of $\bar{\Pi}$, every active set has a support of size $\leqslant k$. Fix such a k. Since activeness is hereditary by definition, it follows that every active set is k-symmetric.

Let $\text{Active}(I)$ be as in Section 6. By the First Fixed-Point Theorem in Section 6, there exists an FO+LFP sentence φ that asserts that $\bar{\Pi}$ accepts I. The sentence φ asserts that there exists i such that $D_f(i,\text{true})$ holds in $\text{Active}(I)$ when f is Output and also when f is Halt. Then $\bar{\Pi}$ accepts I if and only if φ is true in some or equivalently in every transitive substructure of $\text{HF}(I)$ containing all the active elements. In particular, $\bar{\Pi}$ accepts I if and only if $\bar{I}_k$ satisfies φ. By Proposition 2 in Section 2, there is m such that φ is expressible in $L^m_{\infty,\omega}$. By the Equivalence Theorem in Section 9, φ does not distinguish between any sufficiently large input structures I_1, I_2. □

10.2. Bipartite matching is not in choiceless PTime

Bipartite Matching is the following decision problem.

Instance: A bipartite undirected graph $G = (V, E)$ with the two parts (of boys and girls respectively) of the same size.

Question: Does there exists a perfect matching for G?

Recall that a *perfect matching* is a set F of edges such that every vertex is incident to exactly one edge in F. A *partial matching* is an edge set F such that every vertex is incident to at most one edge in F. The standard perfect-matching algorithm starts with the empty partial matching F and then enlarges F in a number of iterations. During each iteration, one constructs an auxiliary set D of directed edges, then seeks a D-path P from an unmatched boy to an unmatched girl, and then modifies F by means of P.

We use variables b, g to vary over boys and girls respectively. If X is a set of edges, let

$$\text{Boys-to-girls}(X) = \{(b,g) : \{b,g\} \in X\},$$

$$\text{Girls-to-boys}(X) = \{(g,b) : \{b,g\} \in X\}.$$

Table 1
The perfect matching algorithm

```
if Mode = Initial then
  F := ∅, Mode := Examine
endif

if Mode = Examine then
  if there is an unmatched boy then
    Mode := Build-Digraph
  else Output := true, Halt := true, Mode := Final
endif

if Mode = Build-Digraph then
  D := Girls-to-boys(F) ∪ Boys-to-girls(E-F)
  Mode := Build-Path
endif

if Mode = Build-Path then
  choose an unmatched boy b
    if (∃ unmatched girl g) REACHABLE_D (b,g) then
      choose an unmatched girl g with REACHABLE(D,b,g)
        P := PATH_D (b,g), Mode := Modify-Matching
      endchoose
    else Output := false, Halt := true, Mode := Final
  endchoose
endif

if Mode = Modify-Matching then
  F := (F - Unordered(P)) ∪ (Unordered(P) - F)
  Mode := Examine
endif
```

And if X is a set of ordered pairs of the form (b,g) or (g,b), let

$$\text{Unordered}(X) = \{\{b,g\} : (b,g) \in X \vee (g,b) \in X\}.$$

In Table 1, we give a self-explanatory program in the ASM language with the the choice construct for the perfect matching algorithm. It is customary to omit the keywords do-in-parallel/enddo. For readability, we take some little additional liberties with the ASM syntax.

The relation REACHABLE and the function PATH in the fourth transition rule are *external*. In other words, we take for granted algorithms that, given a boy b, a girl g and set D of directed edges over V, check whether there exists a D-path from b to g and if yes then construct such a path. For simplicity, we identify a path with the set of its edges.

For the benefit of those unfamiliar with the algorithm, let us explain one iteration of the algorithm in the case when the given bipartite graph has a perfect matching M. Suppose that F is the current partial matching, and there are some F-unmatched

boys. Abusing notation, let $M(b)$ be the girl M-matched to b and let $F(g)$ be the boy F-matched to g. Let D be as in the Build-Digraph rule. For any F-unmatched boy b_0, there exists a D-path P from b_0 to some F-unmatched girl. Indeed, construct

$$g_1 = M(b_0), \; b_1 = F(g_1)$$
$$g_2 = M(b_1), \; b_2 = F(g_2)$$
$$\ldots$$
$$g_k = M(b_{k-1}), \; b_k = F(g_k)$$
$$g_{k+1} = M(b_k)$$

until you encounter an F-unmatched girl g_{k+1}. It is easy to see that, if $X =$ Unordered(P), then $(F - X) \cup (X - F)$ is a partial matching involving one more boy than F did.

Theorem 43 (Bipartite Matching Theorem). *Bipartite Matching is not in* $\tilde{\text{C}}$PTime.

Proof. Given an even integer $n = 2p > 2$, we construct two bipartite graphs G_0 and G_1 on a set

$$V_n = \{b_0, \ldots, b_{n-1}\} \cup \{g_0, \ldots, g_{n-1}\}$$

of n boys and n girls. In G_0, (1) the first p boys and the first p girls form a complete bipartite graph, (2) the last p boys and the last p girls form a complete bipartite graph, and (3) there are no other edges. Clearly, G_0 has a perfect matching. In G_1, (1) the first $p + 1$ boys and the first p girls form a complete bipartite graph, (2) the last $p - 1$ boys and the last p girls form a complete bipartite graph, and (3) there are no other edges. Clearly, G_1 has no perfect matching.

Notice that the two graphs are essentially 4-colored sets; "adjacency" is definable from the colors. The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of the Parity Theorem, except that, instead of the Support Theorem and Equivalence Theorem, we use Corollary 33 and Corollary 41 respectively. □

10.3. An enriched $\tilde{\text{C}}$PTime

In the rest of this section, we consider a modified computation model, designed to overcome the non-computability of Parity in $\tilde{\text{C}}$PTime in the simplest natural way, namely by making the system "aware" of the cardinality of its input.

Enrich the computation model with a static nullary function InputSize. In the definition of initial states with n atoms require that InputSize is the von Neumann ordinal for n. That changes the notion of $\tilde{\text{C}}$PTime; indeed, there is an obvious PTime ASM program with InputSize that accepts all naked sets of odd cardinality and rejects all naked sets of even cardinality. Let us call the new complexity class $\tilde{\text{C}}$PTime$^+$. We show that Bipartite Matching is outside $\tilde{\text{C}}$PTime$^+$.

Remark. $\tilde{\mathrm{C}}\text{PTime}^+$ is still defined in terms of pairs (K_1, K_2) of classes of finite structures of the same vocabulary which are disjoint but not necessarily complementary. It is not clear whether the machines of this extended model can detect when a polynomial time bound expires; the difficulty is in counting the steps performed by parallel subcomputations.

We start with the observation that Corollary 33, the Support Theorem for colored structures, remains true when InputSize is allowed, as a static nullary function, in programs. Indeed since the value of InputSize is a von Neumann ordinal, it involves no atoms and is therefore fixed by all permutations of the atoms. It follows that, when any program Π is run with a colored set I as the input structure, the set $\mathscr{A}$ of active elements is invariant under all automorphisms of I. With this observation, the proof of the Support Theorem for colored structures goes through as before.

Recall from Section 9 that, for any colored set I and any positive integer k, $\bar{I}_k$ denotes the set of k-symmetric elements of $\mathrm{HF}(I)$ as well as the corresponding structure with $\in$, $\emptyset$, and the colors. For our present purposes, we must consider the expansion $(\bar{I}_k, |I|)$ of the structure $\bar{I}_k$ where the cardinality $|I|$ of the input set is named by the nullary symbol InputSize. We show next that the only effect of this extra constant on the equivalence theorem is to restrict the result (as one might expect) to input structures of equal cardinality.

Lemma 44. *Fix positive integers c, k, and m. If I and J are c-colored sets of the same cardinality, and if all the colors $P_0, \ldots, P_{c-1}$ are sufficiently large in both of them, then $(\bar{I}_k, |I|)$ and $(\bar{J}_k, |J|)$ are $L^m_{\infty,\omega}$-equivalent.*

Proof. Observe first that, for each natural number n, there is a form φ_n such that $\varphi_n * \sigma = n$ for every molecule σ. Such φ_n can be defined inductively by

$$\varphi_n = \{(\varphi_r, E) \mid r < n \text{ and } E \text{ is a binary configuration}\}.$$

The verification that $\varphi_n * \sigma = n$ is a trivial induction on n.

Now suppose I and J are as in the hypothesis of the lemma. The m-pebble game for the structures $(\bar{I}_k, |I|)$ and $(\bar{J}_k, |J|)$ is the same as the $(m+1)$-pebble game for $\bar{I}_k$ and $\bar{J}_k$ with one pebble located permanently at the natural number $|I| = |J| = n$ in both structures. Since this number is the denotation of the same form φ_n in both structures, Duplicator can still use the winning strategy described in Section 9: match the forms and the configurations of molecules. $\square$

Let Subset Parity be the following decision problem.
Instance: A structure (I, U) where U is a unary relation on I (i.e., $U \subseteq I$).
Question: Is $|U|$ odd?

Corollary 45. *Subset Parity is not in $\tilde{\mathrm{C}}\text{PTime}^+$.*

Proof. An instance of Subset Parity can be regarded as a 2-colored set, the colors being U and its complement. Fix some ε with $0 < \varepsilon < 1/2$, say $\varepsilon = 1/4$, and consider those

instances of Subset Parity that are ε-level, as defined in our discussion of colored sets at the end of Section 8. By the results there, along with Proposition 2, Theorem 4, and Corollary 3, if Subset Parity were in $\tilde{\text{C}}\text{PTime}^+$ then there would be positive integers m and k such that, whenever (I, U) is a positive instance and (J, V) a negative instance of Subset Parity, both instances being ε-level, then Duplicator has no winning strategy in the m-pebble game for $(\bar{I}_k, |I|)$ and $(\bar{J}_k, |J|)$ (where I abbreviates (I, U) and similarly for J).

On the other hand, by Lemma 44, Duplicator has a winning strategy provided $|I| = |J|$ and all of $|U|$, $|V|$, $|I - U|$, and $|J - V|$ are large enough. This situation and ε-levelness are clearly compatible with $|U|$ being odd and $|V|$ even, so we have a contradiction. $\square$

Theorem 46. *Bipartite Matching is not in* $\tilde{\text{C}}\text{PTime}^+$.

Proof. We can use exactly the same proof as for Theorem 43, because the two structures used in that proof had the same cardinality. $\square$

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